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THE WAR AGAINST ARBITRATION IN MONTANA
Scott J. Burnham'
I. AN IDIOSYNCRATIC VIEW OF CONTRACT
A. Freedom of Contract
Doyle Brunson famously said that poker is a game of people,
not a game of cards. 2 The same can be said for contract law.
Contracts is about people, not about rules. When you grasp this
concept, the apparent complexity of the rules of contracts falls
away like the sun breaking through the clouds, revealing the
subject in its glorious simplicity. The goal of contract law is to
facilitate exchange relationships between people by defining
when they are created, by facilitating their making, and by
unwinding them at their termination. In doing these things, we
assume that people will act reasonably, so the contract rule can
almost always be derived by asking, what would a reasonable
person do?3 My law and economics friends will say that when I
ask what a reasonable person would do, I am really trying to
determine what is economically efficient. 4 That may be, but I
don't know how to determine economic efficiency and, perhaps
unwisely, I think I can determine what is reasonable. So,
recapitulating the experience of hundreds of years of contract
law, I will continue to grope for what is reasonable. If the
economists are right, then our views should largely converge.
1. Professor of Law, The University of Montana School of Law. I wish to thank
my able research assistant John Mastin, a student at The University of Montana School
of Law, for his considerable help. In the interest of full disclosure, I should indicate that
I have been an arbitrator for the Better Business Bureau AutoLine program and am
currently an arbitrator for the National Arbitration Forum.
2. DOYLE BRUNSON, SUPER/SYSTEM 17 (2d ed. 1978).
3. Note that I hedged by inserting "almost." This is law, so there are always
going to be exceptions. More significantly, the rules of contract law are no longer
entirely derived from the common law experience, but with unfortunate frequency also
come from legislation, and I think it is fair to say that legislatures do not always act like
reasonable people. See infra Part I.B.
4. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2 (5th ed., Aspen 1998).
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In playing this game, the parties' freedom to establish their
contracts is of paramount significance. We do not usually
number Freedom of Contract among our cherished liberties, yet
surely it is one of them. 5 The progress of man, it has been said,
is from status to contract. 6 Historically, a dominant group, as
part of its suppression of a subservient group, has frequently
deprived the subservient group of freedom of contract. This is
not the place to track the expansion of freedom of contract as a
civil rights movement, bringing that freedom, for example, to
women, African-Americans, and Indians, but it is a glorious part
of that movement. 7 Free people have the right to contract
freely.8
In Montana, we frequently hear our Constitution praised for
including, in its Article II Declaration of Rights, the inalienable
right "to a clean and healthful environment."9 Less frequently
do we hear that the Montana Constitution gives equal weight to
the inalienable rights "of pursuing life's basic necessities" and of
"acquiring, possessing and protecting property."10  Exercise of
these rights would not be possible without freedom of contract.
The market economy through which we obtain necessities would
cease to function if we could not readily buy and sell. Our
property rights would not be meaningful if we could not readily
transfer property, thereby increasing our wealth.11
5. I was just speaking with one of my students from Poland. She told me that she
never appreciated what a free country this is until she studied Contracts. The fact that
you can sit down with another person and agree to terms that are going to bind you,
without the permission or approval of a governmental agency, came as a revelation to
her. Conversation with Alicja Biskupska 8/14/2004.
6. Famed English jurist Sir Henry Sumner Maine (1822-1888) in ANCIENT LAW:
ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN
IDEAS (10th ed. 1924) argued that "the movement of the progressive societies has
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract." Id. at 174. Maine observed that in
liberal (free) societies, the law treats persons as contracting individuals, not as members
of status groups. Cf. Dennis 0. Lynch, Deferral, Waiver, and Arbitration Under the
NLRA: From Status to Contract and Back Again, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 265 (1989)
(analyzing the substantive outcomes of workplace disputes based upon status rather
than contract).
7. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law:
Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994) (women);
Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the
Classroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1995) (African-Americans); Anna-Emily C. Gaupp, The
Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contracts Encouragement Act of 2000: Smoke
Signals of a New Era in Federal Indian Policy? 33 CONN. L. REV. 667 (2001) (Indians).
8. See discussion infra Part I.C.
9. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
10. Id.
11. Maybe Davy Crockett, or at least the words put in Crockett's mouth by John
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The role of the law in furthering our rights is both
facilitatory in enabling us to exercise our freedoms and
regulatory in channeling our conduct away from harmful
activities. Finding the balance between facilitation and
regulation is a challenge in contract law just as it is in other
social ordering. The respective roles of facilitation and
regulation are somewhat different in the three aspects of
contract law: formation, performance, and termination. In
formation-the determination of whether there is a contract-
we require the parties to conform to social norms of what
reasonable people would think it takes to make a contract. In
making this determination we are regulatory, though quite
tolerant. After all, it would not do for Bob and Carol to form a
contract by incanting "abracadabra" while Ted and Alice form
theirs with "open sesame." We need a general consistency
without a confining rigidity. Contract law can give the parties
guidance ex ante and can examine ex post facto whether what
they have done is sufficient to cause a contract to fall from the
sky. If contract law assumes both parties intended to form a
contract, it may well find that they did, even though they did not
follow the proper guidance. 12 In this, as in all things contract,
the first rule is what is reasonable.
In termination, contract law tries to prevent the failure of
the relationship by helping the parties work through their
problems, but if they reach the point of irreconcilable
differences, it facilitates their divorce. In doing so, contract law
tends to be more regulatory than facilitatory, largely because it
wants to preserve certain economic norms. We have a sense
that more harm may ensue from perpetuating a bad relationship
than from terminating it; therefore, the terminating party may
have to atone for the wrong done but will not be punished for it.
The emphasis is not on fault but on fair allocation of the assets.
Therefore, in the process of termination, the parties must obey
rules that prevent one from taking unreasonable advantage of
the other. The separation may be unpleasant, but it will not
Wayne, said it best: "Republic. I like the sound of the word. It means people can live
free, talk free, go or come, buy or sell, be drunk or sober, however they choose." THE
ALAMO (Republic Pictures 1960).
12. This is, I think, the wisdom of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214
(1917) in which Judge Cardozo stated that "[a] promise may be lacking, and yet the
whole writing may be 'instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly expressed." Id. (quoting
McCall Co. v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775, 779 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909); Moran v. Standard Oil
Co. of N.Y., 105 N.E. 217, 211 (N.Y. 1914)).
2005
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result in ruin. 13
It is in performance that the parties have the most freedom
and contract law is the most facilitatory. Sometimes this aspect
of contract law is called "the law of the contract," as opposed to
"contract law."14 That is, while contract law determines whether
or not the parties made a contract, the law of the contract
determines what contract they made. If the parties reach what
the law recognizes as a contract, but they provide no
performance standards, the law of the contract will facilitate the
relationship by providing the standards for them. Those
standards are, of course, the standards reasonable persons
would have provided had they given the matter any thought. If
I merely agree to buy a peanut from you, without stipulating a
price, the law will impute to me a promise to pay a reasonable
price for it. We call such a supplied rule a default rule. This is
not to say that the parties must act reasonably; reasonable
persons have the freedom to make bad contracts. If it behooves
me to buy a peanut from you for $20, the law will not question
my judgment. I believe our economist friends would say that at
that moment a peanut had more utility for me than $20 did, and
vice-versa for you; so are deals born.1 5
But how unreasonable will the law permit me to be? If I
were to trade my birthright for the infamous peanut, the law,
even if it determined that I was sane and you were without
coercive power, might well determine that we had made a
bargain that no reasonable person in my shoes would have
made, or indeed, that no reasonable person in your shoes would
have extracted. 16 Freedom of contract presupposes the freedom
to make bad choices as well as good ones, just as freedom of
13. More colloquially, the law is tender to dirty contract breakers.
14. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.1 (3d ed. 2004).
15. See The Simpsons: Boy-Scoutz 'N the Hood (Fox television broadcast, Nov. 18,
2003):
Homer: (searching sofa cushions for a peanut) Aw, twenty dollars-I wanted a
peanut.
Homer's Brain: Twenty dollars can buy many peanuts.
Homer: Explain how.
Homer's Brain: Money can be exchanged for goods and services.
Homer: Woo-hoo!
16. "Traditionally, a bargain was said to be unconscionable in an action at law if it
was 'such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand,
and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other;' damages were then limited to
those to which the aggrieved party was 'equitably' entitled." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b. (1981) (citing Hume v. U.S., 132 U.S. 406 (1889) (quoting Earl
of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750))).
Vol. 66
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speech protects Larry Flynt as well as James Joyce. 17 But the
state sees it as its paternalistic function to protect us from some
of our bad choices. Enter the law as police officer, protecting me
from my folly by relieving me of the deal I foolishly made. It
might do this legislatively, regulating the transaction before the
fact, or it might do it judicially, declaring it unconscionable after
the fact. The principle, however, is the same whether achieved
through a legislative or judicial act-either system is asking,
what would reasonable people do?' 8
B. The Common Law and Codes
This example of how contract law might deal with a problem
illustrates how contract law principles developed historically
along two divergent paths that have unfortunately converged:
the golden pathway of the common law and the bramble-strewn
path of codification. 19 When I was asked to train judges of
courts of limited jurisdiction, most of whom are not lawyers, I
was told, teach them contracts in one hour. I quickly realized I
couldn't feed them all the rules in that time, and even if I did,
they would develop indigestion. I then had the epiphany that
the rules merely represent what is reasonable. If the judges
simply decide what is reasonable, they will alight upon the rule
90% of the time.20 In thinking about the law this way, I told
them, they are inheritors of the great common law tradition,
17. Compare Hustler Magazine v. Jerry Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) with U.S. v.
One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), affd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1934).
18. Again, here our economists friends would say that if two autonomous
individuals, acting in their own interests, made the deal, we need inquire no further.
POSNER, supra note 4, § 4.1, at 101.
19. The wayfarer,
Perceiving the pathway to truth,
Was struck with astonishment.
It was thickly grown with weeds.
"Ha," he said,
"I see that none has passed here
In a long time."
Later he saw that each weed
Was a singular knife.
"Well," he mumbled at last,
"Doubtless there are other roads."
STEPHEN CRANE, WAR IS KIND 41 (1899).
20. This reduced my speaking time to five minutes. I then spent the other fifty-
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where the lord of the manor would be asked the rule and would
supply it either from what was customary or what was
reasonable. The law was enormously flexible, for what worked
for Scotland did not necessarily work for Wales, and what
worked for beekeepers did not necessarily work for millers. As
the law began to coalesce, the decisions of the common law
courts embodied these principles.
In other traditions, including the Roman, the French, and
the Spanish, however, the principles were found in codes. Here
a judge did not have to think through what was reasonable or
become familiar with the common law decisions in order to solve
a legal problem; the judge need only open the code to the
appropriate text and the solution would be found. Significant
voices in the Anglo-American tradition believed that there was
benefit to be found in codification. After all, if the law was found
in the decisions of the courts, how could one know the law other
than to read the decisions? 21 And so it happened that in some
jurisdictions, legislatures enacted codifications of the law to
displace their common law tradition. But did the legislature
intend the rules found in those codes to serve the traditional
legislative function of regulation or the traditional common law
function of facilitation?
Ideally, legislation would be only regulatory, advising us in
advance, as with the criminal law, which conduct we should
steer clear of to avoid trouble. Such rules appear even in a code
that is largely facilitatory, such as the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC). For example, UCC section 2-201 tells us that
agreements for the sale of goods for $500 or more must be
evidenced by a writing to be enforceable. If I orally agreed to
buy three peanuts from you for $600, and we also agreed that
this agreement would be enforceable in spite of being within the
confines of section 2-201, we would find that this rule is
regulatory. Our agreement is not enforceable in spite of our
agreement to the contrary. This is a regulatory rule that we
cannot contract around, presumably because it is a formation
rule. 22
21. The answer, of course, is that there is always some entrepreneur eager to make
a buck by performing the service of stating the principles in narrative form, thereby
relieving us of the burden of reading the cases. Such narratives comprise some of the
most distinguished legal works, from WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1969) to
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
22. U.C.C section 1-102 cmt. 2 (2004) provides in part:
This principle of freedom of contract is subject to specific exceptions found
Vol. 66
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On the other hand, most of Article 2 of the UCC is
facilitatory, advising us what the rule would be if we omitted the
term from our contract, but permitting us, should we include the
term, to contract around the facilitatory rule. These statutes,
known as gap-fillers, expressly supply terms only if the parties
omit the term. For example, section 2-305 tells us that "the
price is a reasonable price at the time of delivery." If we agreed
in writing that I would buy three peanuts from you for $600,
this agreement would be enforceable in spite of that statute even
though the reasonable price of those peanuts is much less than
$600. This statute is facilitatory because, in the part that I
conveniently stopped short of quoting, it provides that "the price
is a reasonable price at the time of delivery if... nothing is said
as to price." So we contracted out of that rule by saying
something as to price.
Other UCC sections provide default rules that sound
regulatory, but the parties are free to contract around them. For
example, section 2-612(3) provides that when dealing with an
installment contract, "[w]henever nonconformity or default with
respect to one or more installments substantially impairs the
value of the whole contract there is a breach of the whole."23 If
you are to deliver my peanuts in installments and the first
delivery does not conform to the peanuts you promised, I can't
necessarily terminate the contract, for I don't know that the
non-conformity with respect to one installment "impairs the
value of the whole." You might compensate me for my loss and
deliver conforming installments in the future. If I don't like that
result, because I don't want to deal with a vendor of non-
conforming peanuts, we are free to state in the contract,
"[nlonconformity with respect to one installment permits the
other party to terminate the contract even if the nonconformity
does not impair the value of the whole." This is a default rule
that we are free to change. How do we know that? Presumably
because section 1-102(3) tells us so. That much-neglected
statute, preserving our freedom of contract, provides:
(3) The effect of provisions of this code may be varied by
agreement, except as otherwise provided in this code and except
elsewhere in the Act and to the general exception stated here. The specific
exceptions vary in explicitness: the statute of frauds found in Section 2-201, for
example, does not explicitly preclude oral waiver of the requirement of a
writing, but a fair reading denies enforcement to such a waiver as part of the
"contract" made unenforceable.
23. Codified in Montana at MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-612(3) (2003).
2005
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that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and
care prescribed by this code may not be disclaimed by agreement
but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by
which the performance of such obligations are to be measured if
such standards are not manifestly unreasonable. 2
4
In a purely common law system, statutes would be only
regulatory. We would not need a statute like section 1-102(3) to
tell us that some of the rules are facilitatory. But when a society
decides to codify the law, and it codifies both the regulatory
rules and the facilitatory rules, it creates a great muddle
because the statutes do not come with labels attached declaring
this to be regulatory and that to be facilitatory. And who wants
to be beholden to the historian with the thick glasses, who is
eager to tell us that this one is derived from the common law
while that one is in derogation of it? Did we not enact a
codification scheme so we could look only to the guidance of our
simple code and not to the wisdom stored in dusty volumes?
This problem of discriminating between the facilitatory
statutes and the regulatory ones is acute in a state that adopted
the codes created by David Dudley Field of New York, and hence
known as the Field Code. Alas, Montana is such a state. The
sad story of how Montana became saddled with this monstrosity
is recounted elsewhere and I will not dredge it up again.25 Most
of the Field Code statutes merely codify the common law, and
since the common law permits the parties to change the default
rules by agreement, one would think that these statutes are
facilitatory rather than regulatory. But to judges, the black
letters on the page look an awful lot like regulations.
Furthermore, we are increasingly told that in applying statutes,
we should stick to the "plain language" of the statute and not let
extraneous baggage, like the glorious history of the common law,
get in the way.26
24. Codified in Montana at MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-102(3) (2003).
25. See Andrew P. Morriss et al., Debating the Field Civil Code 105 Years Late, 61
MONT. L. REV. 371 (2000). But I will again say to the Legislature: Repeal the damned
thing.
26. See Fritz Snyder, Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The
Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 573 (1996). In footnote 1, Snyder
writes that "William Eskridge says the 'annus mirabilis' for the renaissance was 1982
when J. WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES (1982); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 527 (1982); and Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of
Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982), were all published. See
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 335 n.1 (1994)."
Vol. 66146
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Unfortunately, there is no Field Code equivalent of UCC
section 1-102(3) to tell us that these statutes may be merely
facilitatory. Well, almost none. In the process of codifying the
law, Field also codified the "maxims of equity," which no one
would claim are regulatory. The maxims were intended
historically (and I do mean historically-the English cadences
ring false, reminding us that they are pale translations of the
original Latin) merely to provide guidance to courts attempting
to do what? (This is a review question.) Right, they were
intended to help courts reach the reasonable result.27 Do we
really need the legislature to tell us that "superfluity does not
vitiate"?28 Or, less succinctly, that "He who can and does not
forbid that which is done on his behalf is deemed to have bidden
it?"29
One of these maxims does appear to permit one to contract
around the law. It tells us:
Waiver of benefit of a law. Anyone may waive the advantage of
a law intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a
public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement. 30
What does this maxim mean? The trouble with the phrase "a
law established for a public reason" is that it sounds exactly like
27. We know this because one of the maxims says so: "Purpose of maxims. The
maxims of jurisprudence set forth in part 2 of this chapter are intended not to qualify
any of the other provisions of this code but to aid in their just application." MONT. CODE
ANN. § 1-3-101 (2003).
28. Id. § 1-3-228 provides in its entirety: "Superfluity. Superfluity does not
vitiate." -
29. Id. § 1-3-210.
30. Id. § 1-3-204. Field Civil Code § 1968, which is identical to the Montana
statute, is based upon two separate legal maxims of jurisprudence. The first is quilibet
potest renunciare juri pro se inducto. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK' 1968 (Proposed Draft 1865). This legal maxim is translated as
"[a]ny one may renounce a right introduced for his own benefit." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1750 (8th ed. 2004). Field suggested that we compare the first legal maxim
with modus et conventio vincunt legem, which is translated as "[c]ustomary form and the
agreement of the parties overcome the law. This is one of the first principles relative to
the law of contract. 2 Coke 73." DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK § 1968 (Proposed Draft 1865); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1734 (8th ed. 2004).
The second legal maxim is privatorum conventio juri publico non derogat. DAVID
DUDLEY FIELD, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 1968 (Proposed Draft
1865). This legal maxim is translated as "[an agreement of private persons does not
derogate from public law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1747 (8th ed. 2004). As support for
this section, Field also quoted this maxim jus publicum privatorum pactis mutari non
potest. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 1968
(Proposed Draft 1865). This maxim is translated as "[a] public right cannot be changed
by agreements of private parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1728 (8th ed. 2004).
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the reason a legislature enacts a statute.3 1 And if every statute
is established for a public reason and one can't contract around a
statute enacted for a public reason, then every statute is
regulatory and none is facilitatory. Freedom of contract has
been replaced by regulation. The Montana Supreme Court fell
into this trap in Rothwell v. Allstate Insurance Co., using this
maxim to support its decision not to allow an employee to waive
the right to indemnification. 32  The court held that the
indemnification statute was "an expression of public policy" that
could not be contracted around. 33 But this reasoning does not
make sense, for if every statute were regulatory, then there
would be no statutes that a person could contract around and
the maxim would serve no function. And we know the maxim
serves a function because another maxim tells us that
"[i]nterpretation must be reasonable. 34  Justice Gray is
probably not up on her Justinian, but she smelled a rat and her
instincts were right:
My second point with regard to the error I perceive in the
Court's opinion is the Court's somewhat loose use of the term "an
expression of public policy" as the equivalent of the language
"established for a public reason" which is contained in § 1-3-204,
MCA. It can-and should-be said that every statute duly enacted
by the Legislature is an expression of public policy with regard to
its subject matter. However, the "public policy" connotation cannot
properly be equated to the "public reason" language in § 1-3-204,
MCA, because to do so would render § 1-3-204, MCA, a nullity.
Section 1-3-204, MCA, clearly contemplates that only some laws
have been established for a "public reason" and, pursuant to the
statute, the benefit of such laws cannot be waived by private
contract. Interpreting "public reason" and "public policy" as
essentially identical renders the language of § 1-3-204, MCA-
permitting waiver of the advantage of a law intended solely for an
individual's benefit-totally ineffective and mere verbiage. Such a
result clearly was not intended by the Legislature and we are
obligated to interpret statutes to give them effect wherever
possible, rather than to render them mere surplusage. Formicove,
Inc. v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (1983), 207 Mont. 189, 194, 673
P.2d 469, 471 (citation omitted). For these reasons, it is my view
that the Court's implicit substitution of "an expression of public
policy" for the statutory language "established for a public reason"
31. See e.g. Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc., 111 A.2d 425 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1955).
32. 1999 MT 50, 12, 293 Mont. 393, 12, 976 P.2d 512, 12.
33. Id. 9.
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-3-233 (2003).
Vol. 66
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is both inappropriate and unsupported. 35
In fact, the Field Code hides in the maxims what is a
fundamental policy. We sometimes forget that freedom of
contract is a constitutionally protected right. In its most
important provision (all right, I exaggerate a bit), the
Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall ... pass any. . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts."36 At the same time, of
course, states have the right to pass laws that promote the
general welfare. These obligations may well conflict when, in
the course of promoting the general welfare, the state deprives
us of our freedom of contract. How do we resolve the dilemma
between the two obligations of the state? By requiring that the
impairment of the obligation of contract be undertaken in the
public interest. So the maxim is simply stating what we would
derive as the reasonable rule: if a provision is regulatory, then
you can't contract around it; but if it is merely facilitatory then
you are free to contract around it, and if it confers a right on
you, then you are free to waive that right.37
35. Rothwell, 24 (Gray, J., dissenting).
36. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
37. There is an excellent discussion of the "public reason" language in De Haviland
v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 67 Cal. App.2d 225, 233-36, 153 P.2d 983, 987-89 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1944) (holding that because CAL. LABOR CODE § 2855 (enacted in Montana at MONT.
CODE ANN. § 28-2-722) was enacted for a public reason, the parties were not free to
contract around it).
The confusion caused by the Field Code provisions was exemplified recently in Cole
v. Valley Ice Garden, 2005 MT 21, 325 Mont. 388, - P.3d -. The issue involved the
enforceability of a liquidated damages clause in light of Montana Code Annotated section
28-2-721. The court applied Montana Code Annotated section 1-3-204 to determine
whether this provision could be waived and concluded that "because Cole waived the
benefit of the liquidated damages law by virtue of the contract provisions he drafted, the
District Court erred in applying the provisions of the liquidated damages statute to the
contract before us." Id. 33.
The court correctly determined that section 28-2-721 is not the kind of regulatory
rule that parties cannot waive. But that does not mean that when the parties have
included a liquidated damages clause in their contract, they have somehow "waived" the
statute. This statute is facilitatory. It merely states the common law rule on the
enforceability of liquidated damages-or at least the rule frozen in time 150 years ago.
See Arrowhead School District No. 75 v. Klyap, 2003 MT 294, 318 Mont. 103, 79 P.3d
250, where the court declined to follow the statute, apparently because of its
obsolescence. Id. 24 n.7.
Instead of finding that the parties waived section 28-2-721, the court should have
applied the statute to determine whether this particular liquidated damages clause was
enforceable. I do not believe that I am overly optimistic in thinking that if all these Field
Code statutes were repealed, the analytical problems that arose in Cole and in Klyap
would go away. I like to think that without the fog created by the statutes, the court
would see the issue more clearly. It would say, "Hmmm. Liquidated damages clause,
eh? Let's analyze it in light of the common law to determine whether it is enforceable."
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Historically, we have gone back and forth between the
emphasis on the general welfare and the emphasis on freedom of
contract. Freedom of contract, or liberty of contract, as it was
often referred to in the Nineteenth Century, took a hard knock
with Lochner v. New York, the case that held that a state
regulation limiting bakers to working a sixty-hour week violated
the workers' freedom of contract. 38 I do not intend by this essay
to advocate a return to the Lochner era, in which, as one author
put it, "the police power could not be used to help those unable
to protect themselves in the marketplace."39 The eternal conflict
of freedom and order is a question of balance, and I merely
maintain that the Montana Supreme Court's view of contract
law is out of balance.
C. The Two Spheres of Contract Law
The common law has traditionally supported the scheme of
letting the parties negotiate the contract that determines the
rules that govern their transaction, as long as they obey the
regulatory rules. But there have always been two spheres of
contract law co-existing rather unhappily. One sphere is the
realm of freely negotiated contracts. The other sphere is the so-
called contract of adhesion, arising when one party with
superior bargaining power dictates non-negotiable terms to the
weaker party, who merely "adheres" to the terms.40 It should be
said that there are those, again largely found among our law
and economics friends, who tell us there is only one sphere.
After all, if weaker parties are being offered such unbalanced
terms, would not the market produce a champion who would
exploit this inefficiency in the system, thereby creating better
terms?
But the mainstream of contract law recognizes the two
spheres and struggles mightily, and I would have to conclude,
unsuccessfully, to reconcile them. As a first principle, as far as
contract law goes (as distinct from the law of the contract), it is
agreed that a contract of adhesion does not generally pose a
formation problem.41  The guidance Anglo-American
38. 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905).
39. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 880 (1987).
40. Promulgation of the term is attributed to Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion - Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
41. "fM]ere inequality in bargaining power does not render a contract
unenforceable, nor are all standardized contracts unenforceable." Kloss v. Edward D.
Vol. 66
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jurisprudence has historically provided for the determination of
whether parties have assented to a contract has proved
remarkably versatile even in an electronic era. For better or
worse, we have chosen to look for "objective manifestation of
assent" even if we sometimes describe assent in a term that rolls
more trippingly from the tongue. 42 While in former days that
manifestation may have been objectified with seals, signatures,
handshakes, and witnesses, today it is as likely objectified by
tearing, clicking, or moving a stylus across a pad. Under this
objective view of assent, it doesn't matter whether both parties
or one of the parties did not read the contract, or read it and did
not understand it. Reading and understanding are subjective;
only an objective manifestation of assent signifies agreement to
form a contract. 43
But when they objectively manifested their assent, what
terms did the parties manifest assent to? Pondering this
question is what gives us a horse race. Freedom of Contract, the
entry of the economists, tells us that the answer must be: all of
them.44 But the economists have by and large a long shot in this
race. The mainstream view, that the parties agreed to all the
dickered terms, but not necessarily to the "boilerplate" terms
Jones & Co., 2002 MT 129, 24, 310 Mont. 123, 24, 54 P.3d 1, 24, cert. denied, 538
U.S. 956 (2003).
Memo to Clinical Students. Stop enacting this scene in my office:
Student (showing me a form contract): My client entered this contract. They
can get out of it, right?
Burnham (warily): On what grounds?
Student: Well, it's a contract of adhesion.
Burnham: Aaaagh! (Has heart attack and is hauled away. Exeunt stage right.)
42. What is the other view of assent to which I am referring? I have some
reluctance to type the very words, lest I memorialize them. On the other hand, the
repression of forbidden words only seems perversely to increase their appeal. Ask any
adolescent. And to tell you, "don't think about X" may only serve the purpose of causing
much rumination about X. So I'd better say it and get on with it. Okay. It is '"M -...._
o _ t__ M __." The Montana Supreme Court properly distinguished these two
concepts of contract formation in Conagra, Inc. v. Nierenberg, 2000 MT 213, 31, 301
Mont. 55, 31, 7 P.3d 369, 31 (2000): "Generally, it is the duty of the court to enforce a
contract if the parties intended that one exist. See Nordwick v. Berg, 223 Mont. 337,
342, 725 P.2d 1195, 1199 (1986) (citations omitted); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-201. Such
intent, in turn, must be gathered from the outward objective manifestations of the
parties and not by the subjective undisclosed intent of one of the parties. Miller v.
Walter, 165 Mont. 221, 226, 527 P.2d 240, 243 (1974) (citations omitted)." (Citations
altered to conform to Bluebook.)
43. Unless one is on the planet Vulcan. I am reliably informed that contracts there
are indeed formed through a M -_-_--_-_-o - t M Star Trek: Dagger of the
Mind (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 3, 1966).
44. POSNER, supra note 4, § 4.1, at 105-06.
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was stated nicely by Karl Llewellyn:
Instead of thinking about 'assent' to boiler-plate clauses, we can
recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at
all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few
dickered terms, and the more broad type of the transaction, but
one thing more. The one thing more is a blanket assent (not a
specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent term the seller
may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the
reasonable meaning of the dickered terms. The fine print that has
not been read has no business to cut under the reasonable
meaning of those dickered terms which constitute the dominant
and only real expression of agreement, but much of it commonly
belongs in.
45
To determine which terms in the adhesion contract are
enforceable and which are not, we rely on two concepts that
limit the power of the stronger party: unconscionability and
reasonable expectations. Some say there is a third concept, the
one described in Restatement (Second) of Contracts section
211(3): "Where the [business] has reason to believe that the
party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that
the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of
the agreement."46  But this concept has largely merged into
reasonable expectations, so I am treating them as a double
entry. 47
Unconscionability we have already touched upon. It is
elusive and undefinable. 48 This is probably because to define is
to limit; nevertheless, like pornography, we know it when we see
it. 49 The two-prong test of Judge Skelley Wright is a helpful
starting point: "Unconscionability has generally been recognized
to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of
the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
45. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370
(1960). This is praise. In my opinion, this is one of the rare moments when Karl stated
something nicely.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
47. "Courts have expanded upon the rule set forth in Restatement section 211(3)
and changed its focus from the expectations of the drafter to those of the consumer. ...
[I]n doing so, courts have transformed section 211(3) into an inquiry not unlike the
doctrine of reasonable expectations .. " Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 458-459 (2002).
48. "That the term is incapable of precise definition is a source of both strength
and weakness." FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 4.28, at 581.
49. "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand
to be embraced.... But I know it when I see it...." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Vol. 66
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favorable to the other party."50 In pinning it down from there, it
would be helpful if attention were paid to the UCC provision on
unconscionability, section 2-302. Not subsection 1, for we know
that this merely codifies a common law concept.51 Attention
must be paid to subsection 2, which provides:
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making
the determination. 52
Here we see that the burden is on the person claiming
unconscionability to prove that in the commercial context the
term is unfair. Perhaps the Federal Trade Commission
definition of unfairness would be persuasive.5 3 In any event,
whatever standard is applied, it is generally accepted that the
police power of the courts extends to striking down
unconscionable contracts or unconscionable terms.
Reasonable expectations is a more modern concept that was
first applied to insurance contracts. 54 The theory begins by
recognizing as reality that most of us, even though we
objectively manifest our assent to form contracts placed before
50. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
51. § 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
U.C.C § 2-302(1) (2003).
See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding
that the principle of unconscionability could be applied to a non-UCC case because it was
a common law principle incorporated into the statute). The Montana Supreme Court
correctly applied this concept in All-States Leasing Co. v. Top Hat Lounge, Inc., 198
Mont. 1, 6, 649 P.2d 1250, 1252 (1982).
52. U.C.C § 2-302(2).
53. The Commission shall have no authority under this section or section [15
USCS § 57a] to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such
act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act or practice is
unfair, the Commission may consider established public policies as evidence to
be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may
not serve as a primary basis for such determination.
15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2000).
54. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy
Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970).
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us, do not in fact read them. 55  Why not? Not reading is
probably a rational choice on our part, for we would probably not
understand many of the terms, and even if we did understand
them and objected to them, we would have no opportunity to
negotiate them. So reading is a waste of our valuable time. 56
But there may be another reason-for better or worse, we think
we know what is in them. One who purchases life insurance or
rents a car has a reasonable idea of what terms a contract for
that transaction contains. Contracting is largely a matter of
risk-shifting, so we can largely assume that the drafter has used
the absence of negotiation as an opportunity to shift the risks to
the weaker party. Knowing that I am unlikely to read ,it, the
drafter might also take advantage of the superior bargaining
position to slip in terms which, even though not unconscionable,
would not be reasonably expected by a party to that contract.
Examples might be a provision in the life insurance contract
that if I smoke, the benefit is not payable, or in the car rental
agreement, that there is an additional insurance premium
payable if I drive on gravel roads. These terms are probably not
unconscionable in the commercial context, as they may
substantially increase the risk of loss on the part of the insurer
and car renter.57 Yet if I am not forewarned of these terms, I
may violate them, thereby exposing myself to a substantial loss.
If I were to complain when I suffered such a loss, one
answer of the law might be to hold me to the contract on the
grounds that I objectively manifested assent to those terms.
One cannot criticize this point of view in theory. But as they
say, it works in theory but it doesn't work in practice. A modern
view would say that since I was not put on reasonable notice of
these unexpected terms, I am not bound by them. 58 The burden
then shifts to the party offering the terms to bring them within
55. This reality excludes those who have discovered the joys of contract reading
after encountering Scott J. Burnham, How to Read a Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 133
(2003).
56. Only 57 percent of Americans read a book in 2002. National Endowment for
the Arts, Reading at Risk: A Survey of Literary Reading in America (June 2004),
available at http://www.nea.gov/pub/ReadingAtRisklpdf.
57. Recall the discussion of our useful friend U.C.C section 2-302(2) in text
accompanying notes 48-53.
58. "The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations." C &
J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Iowa 1975) (quoting
Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Iowa 1973)).
154 Vol. 66
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my reasonable expectations. This is not hard to do. The terms
can be objectively called to my attention. In a written contract,
they might be highlighted in bold print or different-colored ink
on the front page of the contract or separately initialed by me.
On the Internet, they might be highlighted apart from other
terms, or separately checked.
Note that none of these attention-calling devices should
save the unconscionable term. If a term is so shocking to the
conscience that a court would not want one to agree to it, it
should not matter how clearly it was explained or highlighted.
This seems a simple litmus test for determining whether a term
is unconscionable: if the term does not belong in an agreement,
it is unconscionable; if it is permissible in the agreement if
called to one's attention, then it is not unconscionable.
Unconscionable terms are really, really bad. Hint to courts: use
the doctrine sparingly.
Note also that reasonable expectations is an objective
concept-the question is whether the term was objectively
brought to the attention of the reader, not whether the reader
was subjectively aware of it. For example, assume you and I are
both offered the same standard form contract. You, as is your
wont, sign it without looking at it. I, however, versed in the
pleasures of contract reading, cannot restrain my enthusiasm at
the thought of reading the document as though it were the latest
outpouring of Stephen King (and probably equally fiendish).59 I
peruse every word and, because of my training, understand
every word. I then sign it. Later, we both claim that a certain
provision is not binding because of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations. You are home free. Do I lose out because the term
was within my actual expectations? Of course not. I was no
more able than you to negotiate the term (that is our premise-
that the contract is a non-negotiable form contract). I should not
be penalized for having taken the time to try to read and
understand it. To do so would discourage contract reading, and
the law would not be so cruel as to deprive us of such a pleasure.
59. This passage was written before the latest outpouring of Stephen King turned
out to be not a horror story but quite the opposite-a devoted fan's recounting of the
2004 season of the Boston Red Sox. STEPHEN KING & STEWART O'NAN, FAITHFUL (2004).
Is this relevant or am I merely trying to find an excuse to worm a reference to the World
Champion Boston Red Sox into my article? In fact, there is a contract aspect to the
story, as King and O'Nan apparently had an escalator clause in their publishing
agreement that entitled them to more revenues if the Red Sox won the World Series.
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Again, this is why the doctrine is called reasonable expectations.
Whenever you see that word, you know the concept will be
applied objectively and not subjectively. 60
D. Arbitration at Last
Now that is all well and good, you might say, but what does
this interesting discussion have to do with arbitration?
Everything, of course. In dealing with arbitration, we see
played out all the grand themes we have discussed-freedom of
contract v. paternalism, common law v. statutory law,
facilitation v. regulation-as well as a new one, federal v. state
government. In Montana, arbitration is the legal equivalent of
the wolf, a critter much despised except by a fringe group that
would spread it widely.
Some trace this antipathy to arbitration to the allegation
that because judges obtained fees from the cases before them,
every case that went to arbitration took bread from their
mouths. Others, however, find little historical hostility to
arbitration. 61 In any event, a careful examination indicates that
courts do not hate arbitration per se; they hate contracts that
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(2) makes this clear when it
provides: "Such a writing [a standardized agreement] is interpreted wherever reasonable
as treating alike all those similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or
understanding of the standard terms of the writing." The Montana Supreme Court got
this wrong in Chor v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 261 Mont. 143, 862 P.2d 26 (1993).
The court held that the plaintiff could not claim the benefit of the reasonable
expectations doctrine because she admitted she had read the contract. Id., 261 Mont. at
149, 862 P.2d at 30.
61. In Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-71
(1995), Justice Breyer traced some of this alleged history:
First, the basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome
courts' refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate. (citations omitted). The
origins of those refusals apparently lie in ancient times, when the English
courts fought for extension of jurisdiction-all of them being opposed to
anything that would altogether deprive every one of them of jurisdiction.
(citations omitted). American courts initially followed English practice,
perhaps just stand[ing] . . . upon the antiquity of the rule prohibiting
arbitration clause enforcement, rather than upon its excellence or reason.
(citations omitted). Regardless, when Congress passed the Arbitration Act in
1925, it was motivated, first and foremost, by a . . . desire to change this
antiarbitration rule. (citations omitted). It intended courts to enforce
[arbitration] agreements into which parties had entered, (citation omitted) and
to place such agreements 'upon the same footing as other contracts. (citations
omitted).
But Ian Macneil tells us, "In sum, contrary to modern folklore . . . the premodern
statutory law of arbitration was largely supportive of that institution, as was the
common law." IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw 19 (1992).
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 66 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol66/iss1/6
WAR AGAINST ARBITRATION
contain arbitration provisions. What, you may ask, is the
difference? The court is a dispute resolution mechanism in
which rights are vindicated. Citizens have a right to access the
court system, and once in court, the party with the greater right
under the law presumably will prevail.62 In a contract case, the
principles of contract law will be applied and the party claiming
the greater right under contract law will find vindication. 63
Arbitration, on the other hand, is a dispute resolution
mechanism in which, fittingly, disputes are resolved. People go
to arbitration to get their disputes resolved, and not necessarily
to have their rights enforced. It comes as a shock to some to
discover that an arbitrator's error in law is not grounds for
appealing an arbitrator's decision. 64 This rule applies not only
to substantive law, but the law of procedure and evidence as
well. How could it be otherwise, when an arbitrator does not
need to be versed in the law?
So this system, the veritable Antichrist of the legal system,
drives many judges crazy. Why would people voluntarily give up
their right to have their rights vindicated in court? If parties
have a dispute, and voluntarily agree not to take their dispute to
court, but to take their chances with arbitration, judges may
wonder what fever infected their brains. Nevertheless, the
parties venture forth with the court's blessing. In that event,
Montana statutes as early as the Bannack Statutes of 1866
provided rules governing the arbitration. 65 However, a pre-
dispute contract that bound a person to arbitrate future disputes
62. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16.
63. As Portia promised Shylock:
Thyself shalt see the act:
For, as thou urgest justice, be assured
Thou shalt have justice, more than thou desirest.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
64. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12(a), 7 U.L.A. 280 (1997).
Grounds for appealing an arbitrator's decision are normally limited to situations in
which the award was procured by corruption, fraud, undue means, or upon the
misconduct of the arbitrator.
65. In 1864, President Lincoln signed the Organic Act, which created the Montana
Territory. The town of Bannack, in Beaverhead County, was the territorial capitol and
hosted the first territorial legislative session from December 12, 1864 to January 21,
1865. This first legislative assembly enacted what is known as the "Bannack Statutes,"
which were published in 1866 and were based upon the English common law. Andrew P.
Morriss, Montana Field Code Debate: Decius S. Wade's Necessity for Codification, 61
MONT. L. REV. 407 (2000). These statutes, containing Montana's first arbitration
provisions, were re-enacted in 1867, 1871, 1877, 1879, 1887, 1895, 1907, 1921, 1935 and
1947. The Bannack Statutes with respect to arbitration were repealed and replaced by
the Montana Uniform Arbitration Act in 1985. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-101 (2003).
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was another story. As early as 1891, the Montana Supreme
Court declared a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate void as
against public policy:
The question, as to how far courts will be governed by a provision
in the contract, requiring that controversies arising as to the
rights and liabilities of parties thereunder be submitted to
arbitration, has engaged the profound consideration of both
American and English courts of last resort. The conclusion
reached, and probably settled beyond further controversy, is that a
provision in a contract, requiring all differences or controversies
arising between the parties as to their rights and liabilities
thereunder, to be submitted to arbitration, will not be allowed to
interfere with or bar the litigation of such controversies when
brought into court. To enforce such provisions would be to allow
parties to barter away the jurisdiction of courts to determine the
rights of parties and redress their wrongs. Therefore such
provisions are disregarded as against public policy.
66
This common law antipathy to pre-dispute resolution was then
embodied in a statute that the Montana legislature took from
the Field Code in 1895 and that was codified among the statutes
on illegal provisions in contracts:
Restraints upon legal proceedings void. Every stipulation or
condition in a contract by which any party thereto is restricted
from enforcing his rights under the contract by the usual
proceedings in the ordinary tribunals or which limits the time
within which he may thus enforce his rights is void.
67
This statute renders void two kinds of contractual provisions.
One is a provision that limits the statute of limitations. We will
defer discussion of this limitation on freedom of contract to
another day.68 The other provision makes void contractual
66. Randall v. Am. Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 10 Mont. 340, 353, 25 P. 953, 956-
957 (1891) (citing Scott v. Avery, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1855)).
67. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (2003) (originally enacted in Montana in 1895 as
section 2245 of the Montana Civil Code in the form above, and amended in 1985 with the
addition of a new last sentence stating "[tihis section does not affect the validity of an
agreement enforceable under Title 27, chapter 5." Curiously, even though Montana
based its code on the California Code, California had repealed this Field Code provision
in 1873-1874. Historical and Statutory Notes of CAL. Civ. CODE § 1674 (West 1985). So
Montana had to look back to the Field Code itself to find it.
68. Our facilitatory friend the UCC is more flexible, providing that "[b]y the
original agreement the parties may reduce the [4 year] period of limitation to not less
than 1 year but may not extend it." U.C.C § 2-725(1).
Note to students. So how do you reconcile two contradictory statutes, one voiding
changes to the statute of limitations (MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708) and one permitting
changes (MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-725(1))? You presume that the legislature intended
the narrower statute (the one governing sale of goods) to carve out an exception to the
broader rule (the one covering all contracts). In fact we have a statute (of course) telling
us this. Montana Code Annotated section 1-2-102 provides:
Vol. 66
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restrictions on "the usual proceedings in the ordinary tribunals."
Where does this language come from? No one knows for sure.
Its author, David Dudley Field, begins his explanation by
stating, "[t]he first part of this section is acknowledged law. A
covenant in a contract, not to sue for a breach thereof, is void."69
But he then cites no sources for this "acknowledged law." 70 In
any event, the meaning does not seem to be disputed-a person
cannot contractually give up the right to go to court, though as
we shall see, Montana has put a somewhat more provincial spin
on the concept.7 1 Because of Montana Code Annotated section
28-2-708, a party could agree in a contract to arbitrate, go
through the arbitration, end up on the 'short end, and announce
that the result was illegal and unenforceable. 72
Times change, even if Field Code statutes are slow to reflect
the changes, and throughout the twentieth century arbitration
gained momentum. In 1925, the federal government enacted a
Federal Arbitration Act. 73 To understand the reason for the Act,
you have to realize that it took place pre-Erie. Since I had to
recite on it for Professor Peterfreund in Civil Procedure, I still
Intention of the legislature - particular and general provisions. In the
construction of a statute, the intention of the legislature is to be pursued if
possible. When a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is
paramount to the former, so a particular intent will control a general one that
is inconsistent with it.
69. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 832
(Proposed Draft 1865).
70. Id. § 832. Some legal scholars have attributed the concept to Albert Venn
Dicey (1835-1922), Vinerian Professor of English Law at Oxford University, who wrote:
When we say that the supremacy or the rule of law is a characteristic of the
English constitution, we generally include under one expression at least three
distinct though kindred conceptions. We mean in the first place, that no man is
punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a
distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the
ordinary courts of the land ... We mean in the second place.., not only that .
: . no man is above the law but... every man, whatever his rank or condition,
is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of
the ordinary tribunals. [Thirdly] the general principles of the constitution are.
. . the result of judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in
particular cases brought before the courts.
Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 187-96 (1885)
(emphasis added). See Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, The Rule of Law and
Human Rights, 16 FLA. J. INTL. L. 167, 169 (2004). Since Dicey first published his work
in 1885 and Field developed his Civil Code from 1857-1865, it is unlikely that Field was
quoting Dicey.
71. See infra notes 160-188 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cave Constr. Co. v. Dist. Ct, 150 Mont. 18, 430 P.2d 624
(1967) (Petitioner went to court three years after case had been decided in arbitration).
73. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2000).
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recall that Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins74 essentially held that in
diversity cases federal courts would no longer apply federal
common law but would apply the law of the relevant state. In
those pre-Erie days, however, Congress was concerned that
federal courts might refuse to apply state law supportive of
arbitration in diversity cases. Thus, the Act authorized federal
courts to enforce pre-dispute arbitration clauses in state contract
disputes that were heard in federal court.75 In 1983, the United
States Supreme Court got on the arbitration bandwagon when it
decided the case of Southland Corp. v. Keating.76 The effect of
the decision was to take a statute that was intended to make
state law apply in federal court, thus furthering states' rights,
and turn it into a statute that federalized the enforcement of
arbitration clauses.77 The legislative history clearly indicates
that this was never the intention of Congress in passing the
Act. 78 Since the decision, many members of the Supreme Court
have expressed their unhappiness with it. 79 Yet Southland and
74. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
75. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
76. 465 U.S. 1 (1983).
77. Is it a coincidence that one of the senators most anxious to receive assurances
that the Act would not have this pernicious effect was Senator Walsh of Montana? Here
is an excerpt from his testimony at a Senate hearing:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that are
entered into are really not voluntarily [sic] things at all. Take an insurance
policy; there is a blank in it. You can take that or you can leave it. The agent
has no power at all to decide it. Either you can make that contract or you can
not make any contract. It is the same with a good many contracts of
employment. A man says[:] 'These are our terms. All right, take it or leave it.'
Well, there is nothing for the man to do except to sign it; and then he
surrenders his right to have his case tried by the court, and has to have it tried
before a tribunal in which he has no confidence at all.
Allstar Homes v. Waters, 711 So. 2d 924, 931 (Ala. 1997) (Cook, J., specially concurring)
(quoting Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. (1923)).
78. "One rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA's. That
history establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural
statute, applicable only in federal courts, derived, Congress believed, largely from the
federal power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts." Southland, 465 U.S. at 25
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995), Justice
Breyer sounds downright embarrassed in declining to overturn Southland. Justice
O'Connor begrudgingly went along, but only because of stare decisis. Id. at 284
(O'Connor, J. concurring). Justice Scalia, without, of course, citing the legislative history,
nevertheless concluded that "Southland clearly misconstrued the Federal Arbitration
Act." Id. at 284. He then stated that "I shall not in the future dissent from judgments
that rest on Southland." Id. at 285. This left Justice Thomas alone to dissent on this
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its progeny (of which there are many) continue to govern us,
proving the persistence of precedent in the face of reason.80
However wrongheaded it was about the law, the Court could
not have made a clearer statement of policy: nothing should
stand in the path of arbitration. Section 2 of the Act declares
that a written agreement to arbitrate in any contract involving
interstate commerce or a maritime transaction "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."8' Because
the Act was now binding on the states, states could not render
arbitration clauses invalid on grounds that did not apply to
other provisions in contracts.8 2 So we turn now to what the
State of Montana was doing with respect to arbitration clauses.
In 1985, the Montana legislature joined the national trend
toward increasing opportunities for alternative dispute
resolution by substantially modifying Montana Code Annotated
section 28-2-708. The revised statute added this seemingly
innocuous amendment: "This section does not affect the validity
of an agreement enforceable under Title 27, chapter 5."83 The
reference in the amended statute to Title 27, chapter 5 is to the
rules governing arbitration. These rules had previously been in
the Bannack Statutes, but when the legislature amended
Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-705, it also modernized
the procedures for arbitration by replacing those arbitration
statutes with the Uniform Arbitration Act, one of the many
ground by the time the court decided Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,
689 (1996) (Thomas, J. dissenting).
80. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (upholding the precedent that
baseball is a sport, not a business, and therefore not subject to anti-trust regulation).
Note the Montana Supreme Court correctly characterized this history in loss v. Edward
D. Jones & Co., 2002 MT 129, 310 Mont. 123, 54 P.3d 1, cert. denied, 538 U.S. 956 (2003).
81. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
82. An excellent example of a case that applied state contract law to find an
arbitration clause unenforceable is Myers v. MBNA America, No. 00-163-M-DWM, 2001
WL 965063 (D. Mont. March 20, 2001), where Judge Molloy found that no contract was
formed in which the parties agreed to arbitration of disputes. The original credit card
agreement between the parties did not contain an arbitration clause. MBNA, the issuer
of the credit card, purported to amend the terms by proposing an arbitration clause and
informed Myers that "[ilf you do not wish you [sic] account to be subject to this
Arbitration Section, you must write to us .... " Id. *1. Judge Molloy held that under
general principles of contract law, an offer cannot be accepted by the silence of the
offeree. Id. *3. The court also found that a provision in the original agreement that
purported to allow MBNA to unilaterally amend the terms of the contract was overly
broad, as it would permit MBNA to alter Myers' rights and remedies without her
agreement. Id. *4-5.
83. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (1983) (amended 1985).
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Uniform Laws promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL).s4 Reading
the two statutes together, a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate
was no longer illegal-as long as the arbitration complied with
the Uniform Arbitration Act.
Much to the chagrin of NCCUSL, which wants its Uniform
Laws enacted in their uniform form,8 5 when the Montana
legislature enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act, it made a
number of non-uniform amendments that reflected an
unwillingness to embrace enthusiastically the growing trend
toward arbitration. The tepidness of the embrace can be
gleaned from the language of the amendments. The Uniform
Act made express that both pre-dispute and post-dispute
agreements to arbitrate were enforceable:
1. Validity of Arbitration Agreement.
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to
arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to
arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties
is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. This act
also applies to arbitration agreements between employers and
employees or between their respective representatives [unless
otherwise provided in the agreement]. s6
The Montana legislature expressed its acceptance of post-
dispute agreements to arbitrate in its adaptation of Uniform
Arbitration Act section 1:
(1) A written agreement to submit an existing controversy to
arbitration is valid and enforceable except upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.8 7
But it then added non-uniform subsections 2 and 3, making a
clear distinction when it came to pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate:
(2) A written agreement to submit to arbitration any controversy
arising between the parties after the contract is made is valid and
enforceable except upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of a contract. This subsection does not apply to:
84. http://www.nccusl.org.
85. "It is the purpose of the Conference to promote uniformity in the law among
the several States on subjects as to which uniformity is desirable and practicable."
NCCUSL CONST. art.1, § 1.2, available at
http://www.nccusl.orgfUpdate/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=3&tabid=1 (last visited
Jan. 29, 2005). In other words, Why do you think we call them the UNIFORM laws?
86. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1, 7 U.L.A. 6-7 (1997).
87. Codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(1) (1985).
Vol. 66162
24
Montana Law Review, Vol. 66 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol66/iss1/6
WAR AGAINST ARBITRATION
(a) claims arising out of personal injury, whether based on
contract or tort;
(b) any agreement concerning or relating to insurance policies
or annuity contracts except for those contracts between
insurance companies;
(c) any contract by an individual for the acquisition of real or
personal property, services, or money or credit where the total
consideration to be paid or furnished by the individual is
$35,000 or less; and
(d) claims for workers' compensation.
(3) Notice that a contract is subject to arbitration pursuant to this
chapter shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the first
page of the contract; and unless such notice is displayed thereon,
the contract may not be subject to arbitration.88
The amendments in subsection (2) restrict the kinds of
agreements that may contain an agreement to arbitrate.
Particularly noteworthy is subsection (2)(c), which prevents
consumers from bring able to arbitrate virtually all disputes.
One wonders if such a provision protects consumers, for when a
small amount of money is involved, recourse to the courts often
involves higher transaction costs than going to arbitration. But
it is the amendment in subsection (3) that proved particularly
problematic. Recall our discussion of reasonable expectations. 89
The legislature seemed to be using that doctrine in making an
arbitration provision enforceable only if it is objectively called to
the attention of the parties to the contract. Under that doctrine,
such objectification saves a provision that would otherwise be
judged unfair. Hence, this statute signaled that the legislature
deemed arbitration provisions presumptively unfair. And
because it singled out arbitration, it invited federal scrutiny
under the Federal Arbitration Act. Moreover, it was inevitable
that a national entity was not going to tailor its contract to the
requirements of such a small market as Montana, making it a
certainty that the enforceability of the statute would eventually
be litigated.
Furthermore, the legislature added this language to the
Uniform Arbitration Act section 18:
No agreement concerning venue involving a resident of this state
is valid unless the agreement requires that arbitration occur
within the state of Montana. This requirement may only be
waived upon the advice of counsel as evidenced by counsel's
88. Id. § 27-5-114(2)-(3) (1985).
89. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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signature thereto. 90
This interesting provision saves Montanans the hardship of
traveling to a distant location to arbitrate their claims, and
possibly providing them with an arbitrator more familiar with
local mores. It was also inevitable that national corporations
would neglect to tailor their agreements to accommodate this
requirement. Note, however, that this provision does not so
clearly fall afoul of the Federal Arbitration Act; it does not
prevent the arbitration, but merely requires that it be held in
Montana.
So we now had a federal act that imposed on the states an
obligation not to treat arbitration provisions differently from
any other contractual provision, and a state statute that
imposed some restrictions on the enforceability of arbitration
provisions. The competing forces were poised for battle.
II. THE BATTLE OF CASAROTTO
That showdown came in 1994 in Casarotto v. Lombardi.91
Great Falls residents Paul and Pamela Casarotto entered into a
franchise agreement with defendant Doctor's Associates, Inc.
(DAI), the legal name for the Subway Sandwich Shop
franchisor. 92 The Casarottos alleged that DAI's agent, Nick
Lombardi, orally promised them that they would have the right
to move their shop to a more desirable location when that
location became available.93 Alleging breach of this promise, the
Casarottos sued Lombardi and DAI in district court in Cascade
County, Montana. 94
Citing a clause in the contract requiring the parties to
arbitrate any dispute in Bridgeport, Connecticut, the location of
Subway's main office, defendants moved to dismiss. Defendants'
claim rested on the requirement of the Federal Arbitration Act
that provided that if a contract has an issue referable to
arbitration, the court is required to stay the proceedings. 95 The
90. Codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-323 (1985).
91. 268 Mont. 369, 886 P.2d 931 (1994) [hereinafter Casarotto I].
92. Id., 268 Mont. at 371, 886 P.2d at 932.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id., 268 Mont. at 372, 886 P.2d at 933. Additionally, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000)
provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that
164 Vol. 66
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Casarottos, seizing upon the fact that DAI had neglected to
include on the first page of the agreement the notice that the
Montana Uniform Arbitration Act required as a prerequisite to
arbitration, asked the court not to honor the arbitration clause. 96
Finding that under the choice of law clause in the contract,
Connecticut law governed the agreement, and that Connecticut
law did not similarly restrict arbitration, the district court
granted the motion to stay legal proceedings pending arbitration
of the dispute.97 The Casarottos appealed.
The Montana Supreme Court heard the oral argument in
Missoula during Law Week in 1994. DAI's urbane, Yale-
educated attorney began his argument with a pleasantry. "It is
a pleasure to be here in Montana after my trip from
Connecticut," he began. Justice Trieweiler leaned over and
inquired politely, "Was it a long trip, counselor?" "A very long
trip," the attorney responded, not realizing he was stepping into
a trap. "Well, counselor," Trieweiler continued, snapping closed
the jaws of the trap, "that's how far these plaintiffs would have
to travel to have their case heard by an arbitrator." The rest of
the argument consisted of the attorney's attempt to escape from
that ill-fated beginning. 98
Curiously, although Justice Trieweiler's point about the
location of the arbitration raised an interesting practical point,
the Casarottos had not raised the legal question of whether the
Connecticut venue violated Montana's Uniform Arbitration Act
requirement that "[n]o agreement concerning venue involving a
resident of this state is valid unless the agreement requires that
arbitration occur within the state of Montana."99 Instead, there
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under
such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement.
96. Casarotto I, 268 Mont. at 372 ,886 P.2d at 933. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-
114(3) (1985). See supra note 88 and accompanying text. It has always seemed bizarre
to me to refer to the non-uniform Montana enactment as the "Uniform Arbitration Act,"
but in fact Montana Code Annotated section 27-5-111 (1985) provides in its entirety:
"Short Title. This chapter may be cited as the 'Uniform Arbitration Act."'
97. Casarotto , 268 Mont. at 371, 886 P.2d at 932.
98. The tape of the hearing is no longer available. I was present at the argument
and this narrative is derived from my recollection of the event.
99. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-323 (1985). See supra note 90 and accompanying
text. It is possible that the plaintiffs overlooked the statute. It is more likely that they
determined that a finding that DAI had violated that statute would not have given them
the relief they wanted. It seems to me that that statute renders the venue invalid, but
does not render the arbitration clause invalid. In other words, if they had prevailed on
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were two issues to resolve. First was the choice of law issue:
Would the court's resolution be governed by Montana law or
Connecticut law (or theoretically some other body of law)?
Second, if the contract was governed by Montana law, which
required the notice for an arbitration clause to be effective, was
the Montana statute requiring notice pre-empted by the FAA?
In the majority opinion, penned by Justice Trieweiler and
joined by Justices Harrison, Hunt, and Nelson, the court first
addressed the choice of law issue. Recall that choice of law is
not a question of jurisdiction or venue, but simply the question
of which jurisdiction's law the forum court (here Montana) will
apply to resolve the dispute. The court stated the law correctly,
using as authority a sound source, the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws.100 The general rules, cited by the court, are
that in the absence of a choice of law clause in the contract, the
forum state applies the law of the state that "has the most
significant relationship to the transaction and the parties."'101
Additionally, if there is a choice of law clause in the contract, the
chosen law will govern unless the chosen state law has no
substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction, or the
law of the chosen state would be contrary to "a fundamental
policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue .... "102
The court found that because Montana had the most
significant relationship to the transaction, Montana law would
govern in the absence of a choice of law clause. 10 3 Given the
facts that the plaintiffs resided in Montana and the franchise
was located in Montana, this seems a fair conclusion. However,
because the contract contained a choice of law clause that
stipulated Connecticut law, Montana law would govern only if
Connecticut had no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction, or the law of Connecticut was contrary to "a
fundamental policy" of Montana.'0 4 The first condition plainly
did not apply, as Connecticut bore a substantial connection to
that ground, they would have been required to go to arbitration in Montana. If they
wanted their day in court, that would not have been adequate relief.
100. Casarotto 1, 268 Mont. at 373-75, 886 P.2d at 934-35 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971)).
101. Id., 268 Mont. at 373, 886 P.2d at 934 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971)).
102. Id., 268 Mont. at 375, 886 P.2d at 935 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971)).
103. Id., 268 Mont. at 375, 886 P.2d at 935.
104. Id., 268 Mont. at 374-75, 886 P.2d at 934-35.
166 Vol. 66
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the parties and the transaction. The issue, then, came down to
whether Connecticut law was contrary to a fundamental policy
of Montana.105
The court concluded that the notice requirement established
a fundamental public policy of Montana because it was enacted
by the legislature and because it protected our citizens from the
horrors of arbitration. In its own words, here is how the court
justified this conclusion:
In Trammel v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen (1953), 126 Mont. 400, 409, 253 P.2d 329, 334, we held
that the public policy of a state is established by its express
legislative enactments. Here, the legislative history for §
27-5-114(4), MCA, makes clear that the legislative committee
members considering adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act had
two primary concerns. First, they did not want Montanans to
waive their constitutional right of access to Montana's courts
unknowingly, and second, they were concerned about Montanans
being compelled to arbitrate disputes at distant locations beyond
the borders of our State.
The facts in this case, and our recent decision in another case,
justify those concerns.
Regardless of the amount in controversy between these parties,
the arbitration clause in the Subway Sandwich Shop Franchise
Agreement requires that the Casarottos travel thousands of miles
to Connecticut to have their dispute arbitrated. Furthermore, it
requires that they share equally in the expense of arbitration,
regardless of the merits of their claim. Presumably, that expense
could be substantial, since under the Commercial Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association (1992), those
expenses would, at a minimum, include: the arbitrator's fees and
travel expenses, the cost of witnesses chosen by the arbitrator, the
American Arbitration Association's administrative charges, and a
filing fee of up to $4000, depending on the amount in controversy.
For a proceeding involving multiple arbitrators, the
administrative fee alone, for which the Casarottos would be
responsible, is $150 a day. In addition, since the contract called
for the application of Connecticut law, the Casarottos would be
required to retain the services of a Connecticut attorney.
In spite of the expense set forth above, the procedural
safeguards which have been established in Montana to assure the
reliability of the outcome in dispute resolutions are absent in an
arbitration proceeding. The extent of pretrial discovery is within
the sole discretion of the arbitrator and the rules of evidence are
not applicable. The arbitrator does not have to follow any law, and
there does not have to be a factual basis for the arbitrator's
decision. See May v. First National Pawn Brokers, Ltd.
105. Id., 268 Mont. at 375, 886 P.2d at 935.
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(Mont. , 1994), Slip Op. 94-189.
Based upon the determination by the Legislature of this State
that the citizens of this State are at least entitled to notice before
entering into an agreement which will limit their future resolution
of disputes to a procedure as potentially inconvenient, expensive,
and devoid of procedural safeguards as the one provided for by the
rules of the American Arbitration Association, and the terms of
this contract, we conclude that the notice requirement of § 27-
5-114, MCA, does establish a fundamental public policy in
Montana, and that the application of Connecticut law would be
contrary to that policy. Therefore, we conclude that the law of
Montana governs the franchise agreement entered into between
the Casarottos and Doctor's Associates, Inc.
10 6
The court here overplayed its hand. The issue was whether the
absence of a notice requirement showed that Connecticut's law
was contrary to a fundamental policy of Montana. That was the
only relevant difference between Montana law and Connecticut
law. The fact that a party has to travel to an arbitration, the
fact that arbitration may be more costly than court, and the fact
that arbitration does not have the same procedural rules as
court are not differences between Connecticut policy and
Montana policy. They are differences between arbitration and
court. The villain here was obviously not Connecticut's policy,
but arbitration itself.
Is the fact that one state had a notice requirement and the
other didn't enough to invoke Montana law? That would depend
on the meaning of the "fundamental policy" language of the
Restatement. In a dissent joined by Justice Turnage, Justice
Weber concluded that because the choice of Connecticut law was
effective, the notice requirement was not applicable to the
contract, so he did not analyze the issue. 10 7 In another dissent,
also joined by Justice Turnage, Justice Gray pointed out that the
notice requirement did not apply to every arbitration agreement
entered into by a Montanan, but only to those to which Montana
law applied. Because the parties chose Connecticut law, the
notice requirement was not applicable and "cannot form the
basis of a public policy broad enough to negate the parties'
choice of Connecticut law."1 08
Justice Gray's questioning whether there is broad public
policy here is reminiscent of her analysis of the meaning of "a
law established for a public reason" in Montana Code Annotated
106. Id., 268 Mont. at 375-77, 886 P.2d at 935-36.
107. Casarotto I, 268 Mont. at 387-88, 886 P.2d at 942'(Weber, J., dissenting).
108. Id., 268 Mont. at 392, 886 P.2d at 945 (Gray, J., dissenting).
168 Vol. 66
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section 1-3-204, where she concluded that the language cannot
merely mean that the legislature has enacted the law. 109 This
analysis seems correct in this context as well, for if the fact that
the legislature enacted a law made it "fundamental public
policy" of the state, then the mere fact that the law of Montana
differed from the law of the other jurisdiction would render that
state's law inapplicable. A court must require something more
than mere enactment to determine that a law reflects a
"fundamental policy."
What is a fundamental policy? Benjamin Cardozo wrote:
The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the
pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency
or fairness. They do not close their doors, unless help would
violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent
conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal.110
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws states in the
comments to section 187 that "a fundamental policy may be
embodied in a statute which makes one or more kinds of
contracts illegal or which is designed to protect a person against
the oppressive use of superior bargaining power."1 1  The
Montana Supreme Court might well say that is exactly what the
notice statute did in this case, but once again the argument is
circular. The statute has obvious application where there is
superior bargaining power, for the party who negotiated a
contract is more likely to know that there is an arbitration
provision than a party who merely "adheres" to the contract.
But the need for protection against "oppressive use" is only
present if it is presumed that arbitration is oppressive. And
that belief clearly drove the majority decision.
The court next addressed whether the Federal Arbitration
Act preempted the Montana notice requirement. Section 2 of
the Act provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
109. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
110. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g (1971).
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contract. 112
The Act's prohibition of enforcement of an arbitration clause
"save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract" means that courts cannot subject
arbitration clauses to treatment not given to other clauses. It
would seem that the majority of the Montana Supreme Court
had shot itself in the foot, for in resolving the first issue, it made
clear 'that what made Montana's policy different from
Connecticut's was the special treatment of arbitration clauses in
Montana. After all, Montana did not require that other
clauses-even illegal ones such as exculpatory clauses 113 and
restrictive covenants 114-be pronounced in underlined capital
letters on the first page, but only arbitration clauses. The clause
in this case was clearly avoided because it was an arbitration
clause, not because of the application of general principles of law
or equity.
Yet, not surprisingly, the court did not follow its own logic.
The court first recognized that in Volt Information Sciences, Inc.
v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford University115 the
Supreme Court had stated that a state law was pre-empted if it
"would undermine the goals and policies of the FAA."116 It then
reasoned that the goals and policies of the Federal Arbitration
Act were not to force unwilling parties to arbitrate, but to
enforce agreements that parties had willingly entered into. The
purpose of the Montana notice requirement was to ensure that
parties entered into arbitration clauses knowingly. Therefore,
the court concluded that the notice requirement did not
undermine the goals and policies of the Federal Arbitration Act
and was not pre-empted. Therefore the Casarottos did not have
to take their dispute to arbitration. 17
In a "specially concurring" opinion, Justice Trieweiler gave
his personal opirion of those who supported the use of
arbitration to deprive citizens of their day in court.118 Any
paraphrase of this polemic would not do it justice, and I urge the
112. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
113. MONT. CODE ANN.§ 28-2-702 (1985) as interpreted in Miller v. Fallon County,
222 Mont. 214, 721 P.2d 342 (1986).
114. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (2003).
115. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
116. Casarotto I, 268 Mont. 369, 379, 886 P.2d 931, 937.
117. Id., 268 Mont. at 382, 886 P.2d at 939.
118. Id. (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring). The special concurrence was joined by
no other member of the court.
170 Vol. 66
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reader to read it in its entirety. The opinion began by
celebrating the virtues of the court system as opposed to the
arbitration system: "While our system of justice and our rules
are imperfect, they have as their ultimate purpose one
overriding principle. They are intended, and continue to evolve,
for the purpose of. providing fairness to people, regardless of
their wealth or political influence." 119 Justice Trieweiler might
be uncomprehending if one freely chose this alternative system,
but that was not his concern. Instead, he was concerned with
those who entered contracts of adhesion that contained
arbitration clause. He stated:
What I would like the people in the federal judiciary, especially
at the appellate level, to understand is that due to their
misinterpretation of congressional intent when it enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act, and due to their naive assumption that
arbitration provisions and choice of law provisions are knowingly
bargained for, all of these procedural safeguards and substantive
laws are easily avoided by any party with enough leverage to stick
a choice of law and an arbitration provision in its pre-printed
contract and require the party with inferior bargaining power to
sign it.
The procedures we have established, and the laws we have
enacted, are either inapplicable or unenforceable in the process we
refer to as arbitration.1 20
This observation is curiously absent from the majority opinion in
Casarotto I, which contained no mention of unequal bargaining
power in the analysis. The majority opinion focused on the
notice requirement as evidencing a knowing assent to the
arbitration clause. If unequal bargaining power, as opposed to
knowledge, was the issue, it was not found in the opinion. Of
course, the notice requirement itself would not assist a party
with little bargaining power against a party who put the proper
notice on the first page of the contract. Something more than
the notice requirement would be required to help those parties.
Therefore, Justice Trieweiler's concurrence makes clear that
lack of bargaining power was a factor in his reasoning:
The notion by federal judges, like Judge Selya, that people like
the Casarottos have knowingly and voluntarily bargained and
agreed to resolve their contractual disputes or tort claims by
arbitration, is naive at best, and self-serving and cynical at worst.
To me, the idea of a contract or agreement suggests mutuality.
There is no mutuality in a franchise agreement, a securities
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brokerage agreement, or in any other of the agreements which
typically impose arbitration as the means for resolving disputes.
National franchisors, like the defendant in this case, and
brokerage firms, who have been the defendants in many other
arbitration cases, present form contracts to franchisees and
consumers in which choice of law provisions and arbitration
provisions are not negotiable, and the consequences of which are
not explained. The provision is either accepted, or the business or
investment opportunity is denied. Yet these provisions, which are
not only approved of, but encouraged by people like Judge Selya,
do, in effect, subvert our system of justice as we have come to
know it. If any foreign government tried to do the same, we would
surely consider it a serious act of aggression. 121
Trieweiler has a reputation as a liberal, but on this point he
sounds not unlike our Freemen friends. The point of congruity
is the championship of states' rights in the face of pre-emption
by the federal government.
Two dissents shredded the logic of the majority on the pre-
emption issue. In a dissent joined by Justice Turnage, Justice
Weber stated that he understood Volt as holding that "the
agreement to arbitrate should be enforced according to its
terms."'122 Therefore, the arbitration as agreed to by DAI and
the Casarottos should go forward. Weber also cited two cases,
one from the Second Circuit applying Vermont law and the other
from Missouri, both of which held that state statutes like the
Montana statutes were preempted by the Federal Arbitration
Act. 123 In another dissent, also joined by Justice Turnage,
Justice Gray also examined the notice requirement in the light
of Southland, in which the Supreme Court found in the Federal
Arbitration Act a congressional intent "to foreclose state
legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration
agreements."' 124 Under the facts of Casarotto I, she found that
the notice requirement "undermines the purpose of the FAA by
rendering the parties' arbitration agreement unenforceable." 125
After the decision in Casarotto I was handed down, the
defendants petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari. That petition was granted. The Supreme Court
121. Id., 268 Mont. at 384-85, 886 P.2d at 940-41.
122. Casarotto I., 268 Mont. at 389, 886 P.2d at 944 (citing Threlkeld v.
Metallgesellschaft, 923 F.2d 245 (2d. Cir. 1991); Bunge Corp. v. Perryville Feed &
Produce, 685 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. 1985)) (Weber, J., dissenting).
123. Id., 268 Mont. at 390-391, 886 P.2d at 944.
124. Id., 268 Mont. at 393, 886 P.2d at 946 (quoting Southland, 465 U.S. at 16)
(Gray, J., dissenting).
125. Id., 268 Mont. at 395, 886 P.2d at 947 (Gray, J., dissenting).
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ordered the judgment vacated and remanded the case to the
Montana Supreme Court for further consideration in light of
that U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson.126 As instructed, the court took a look at Dobson,
and, not taking the hint from the Supreme Court, found it
distinguishable from Casarotto I. Dobson involved an Alabama
statute that was exactly the same as the pre-1985 Montana
statute that made pre-dispute arbitration agreements invalid.127
In an opinion joined by Justices Nelson, Hunt, and Leaphart,
Justice Trieweiler wrote:
After careful review, we can find nothing in the Dobson decision
which relates to the issues presented to this Court in this case.
Our prior Casarotto decision did not involve state law which made
arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable. Our state law
simply requires that the parties be adequately informed of what
they are doing before they enter into an arbitration agreement. 128
Justice Leaphart, who had replaced Justice John C. Harrison
on the bench after the court decided Casarotto I, wrote a
specially concurring opinion in which he echoed some of the
sentiment about contracts of adhesion found in Justice
Trieweiler's special concurrence in Casarotto I:
In Dobson, the United States Supreme Court held that the FAA
preempts anti-arbitration state statutes which invalidate
arbitration agreements. Section 27-5-114(4), MCA, cannot be
characterized as anti-arbitration nor does it invalidate arbitration
agreements. On the contrary, it is one section of Montana's
Uniform Arbitration Act which specifically recognizes arbitration
agreements: "A written agreement to submit an existing
controversy to arbitration is valid and enforceable except upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of a
contract." Section 27-5-114(1), MCA. The notice requirement of
subsection (4) merely protects the consumer by requiring that
notice of an arbitration provision be conspicuously placed on the
front page of the contract. This does not undermine the
pro-arbitration policy of the FAA. Rather, it furthers the policy of
meaningful and consensual arbitration by helping ensure that the
consumer who signs what is most often a nonnegotiated, form
contract, knowingly agrees to arbitration in the event of a dispute.
I see no inconsistency between Dobson and our decision in
Casarotto and I specially concur in the Court's decision to reaffirm
and reinstate its December 15, 1994 opinion.129
126. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 274 Mont. 3, 4, 901 P.2d 596, 597 (1995) (citing Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)) [hereinafter Casarotto II].
127. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
128. Casarotto II, 274 Mont. at 7, 901 P.2d at 598.
129. Id., 274 Mont. at 9, 901 P.2d at 599 (Leaphart, J., specially concurring).
2005
35
Burnham: The War Against Arbitration in Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2005
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
At first blush, Justice Leaphart's concern for "the consumer who
signs what is most often a nonnegotiated, form contract," seems
off the mark. Because the purchase of a Subway franchise is a
business transaction, and a costly transaction at that, it seems
odd to characterize the purchaser as a consumer, for "consumer"
is usually defined as one who enters into a transaction for
personal, family, or household purposes. 130 On the other hand,
the purchase of a Subway franchise is analogous to a consumer
transaction, for the purchaser lacks bargaining power and must
sign the document that is put in front of him.' 3131 As we have
earlier discussed, it is appropriate for a court to use its police
power to review the terms of a non-negotiated contract for
onerous terms. The surprising aspect is that an arbitration
clause per se, as opposed to a demonstrably unfair arbitration
clause, 132 would be regarded as such a term, but Justice
Leaphart apparently shared the court's hostility to arbitration.
Justice Gray, in a dissent joined by Justices Turnage and
Weber, found that Dobson expressed the fundamental premise
that "the basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to
overcome courts' refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate."'133
Because the Montana notice requirement "undercuts,
undermines and renders unenforceable the parties' agreement to
arbitrate," she concluded that Casarotto I should have been
reversed in the light of Dobson. 134
When the defendants again petitioned for certiorari, the
Supreme Court accepted the case, rendering its decision in
Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto.3 135 In an opinion by
Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that the notice requirement
"places arbitration agreements in a class apart from 'any
contract,' and singularly limits their validity. The State's
prescription is thus inconsistent with, and is therefore
130. Cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-102(1) (2003) (defining "consumer" for purposes
of the Consumer Protection Act).
131. On the franchise agreement as a contract of adhesion, see Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1178 (1983).
See also Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 221 Mont. 447, 450, 720 P.2d 1148, 1150 (1986)
(describing the non-negotiable purchase of a Baskin-Robbins franchise).
132. See infra note 141 and accompanying text for a discussion of what might
constitute an unconscionable arbitration clause.
133. Casarotto II, 274 Mont. at 10, 901 P.2d at 600 (Gray, J., dissenting) (quoting
Dobson, 513 U.S. at 270).
134. Id., 274 Mont. at 16, 901 P.2d at 600.
135. 517 U.S. 681 (1996) [hereinafter Casarotto III].
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preempted by, the federal law."136 The Court reiterated that, as
provided in § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, states may
regulate contracts under contract law principles, but "[wihat
States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to
enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair
enough to enforce its arbitration clause."13 7  In these
circumstances, the Court held, the notice requirement failed
because it was applicable only to arbitration provisions. 138
Why didn't the Montana Supreme Court find some other
basis for invalidating the arbitration provision? One
commentator suggests that the court could have used the law of
contract formation to invalidate the arbitration clause without
running afoul of the FAA. 139 Furthermore, the court itself, in
describing the reasons for the notice provision, stated that the
legislature "did not want Montanans to waive their
constitutional right of access to Montana's courts
unknowingly."'140 Yet the waiver of constitutional rights was
never mentioned again. But some other line of reasoning based
on contract formation claims would probably have proved
unavailing. In a footnote, the Supreme Court briefly addressed
these claims:
At oral argument, counsel for Casarotto urged a broader view,
under which § 27-5-114(4) might be regarded as harmless surplus.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-32. Montana could have invalidated the
arbitration clause in the franchise agreement under general,
informed consent principles, counsel suggested. She asked us to
regard § 27-5-114(4) as but one illustration of a cross-the-board
rule: Unexpected provisions in adhesion contracts must be
conspicuous. See also Brief for Respondents 21-24. But the
Montana Supreme Court announced no such sweeping rule. The
court did not assert as a basis for its decision a generally
applicable principle of "reasonable expectations" governing any
standard form contract term. Cf. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle,
202 Mont. 173, 180, 656 P.2d 820, 824 (1983) (invalidating
provision in auto insurance policy that did not "honor the
reasonable expectations" of the insured). Montana's decision
trains on and upholds a particular statute, one setting out a
precise, arbitration-specific limitation. We review that disposition,
and no other. It bears reiteration, however, that a court may not
136. Id. at 688.
137. Id. at 686 (quoting Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281).
138. Id. at 687.
139. Traci L. Jones, State Law of Contract Formation in the Shadow of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 46 DUKE L.J. 651 (1996).
140. Casarotto 1, 268 Mont. at 376, 886 P.2d at 935.
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"rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for
a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for
this would enable the court to effect what.., the state legislature
cannot."
14 1
In this footnote, the Court. initially seems sympathetic to the
argument that the reasonable expectatibns doctrine could be
applied to arbitration clauses. If this were the case, then it left
the door open for Montana to invalidate agreements to arbitrate,
at least in contracts of adhesion, not by employing a statute
directed only at arbitration clauses, but by employing basic
principles of contract law. The closest the Montana Supreme
Court came to basing its reasoning on something other than the
statute was Justice Leaphart's suggestion in Casarotto II that
"[t]he notice requirement of subsection (4) merely protects the
consumer by requiring that notice of an arbitration provision be
conspicuously placed on the front page of the contract." 142 That
rationale sounds very close to the Supreme Court's
characterization of the oral argument as arguing that the
statute was merely requiring that "[u]nexpected provisions in
141. Casarotto IIl, 517 U.S. at 687 n.3 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.
9 (1987)). The language from Perry is worth quoting in full:
We also decline to address Thomas' claim that the arbitration agreement in
this case constitutes an unconscionable, unenforceable contract of adhesion.
This issue was not decided below, see nn. 4 and 6, supra, and may likewise be
considered on remand.
We note, however, the choice-of-law issue that arises when defenses such as
Thomas' so-called "standing" and unconscionability arguments are asserted. In
instances such as these, the text of § 2 provides the touchstone for choosing
between state-law principles and the principles of federal common law
envisioned by the passage of that statute: An agreement to arbitrate is valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, as a matter of federal law, see Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), "save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). Thus state law, whether of legislative
or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the
validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law
principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to
arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of § 2. See Prima
Paint, 388 U.S., at 404; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S., at 16-17 n. 11. A
court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an
arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner different from
that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state
law. Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a
basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for
this would enable the court to effect what we hold today the state legislature
cannot.
482 U.S. at 492 n.9 (emphasis in original) (citations altered to conform to Bluebook).
142. Casarotto II, 274 Mont. at 9, 901 P.2d at 599 (Leaphart, J., specially
concurring).
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adhesion contacts must be conspicuous."143 The last sentence of
the footnote, however, seems to warn the Montana Supreme
Court not to try that approach. When the Court said, "It bears
reiteration, however, that a court may not 'rely on the
uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a
state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for
this would enable the court to effect what . . . the state
legislature cannot,"' it seemed to be saying that if the Montana
Supreme Court always found that an agreement to arbitrate
must be stricken as unconscionable, then the court would once
again have unlawfully prohibited an agreement to arbitrate. As
we shall see, these arguments would lie buried like moles only to
later emerge into the sunlight.
The Supreme Court concluded Casarotto III with the usual
language of reversal, stating that "the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Montana is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion."144 Those
further proceedings would require the court to vacate its
judgment in Casarotto II and order that the arbitration go
forward. When the Montana Supreme Court issued the order,
Justices Trieweiler and Hunt, in a final act of defiance at the
federal authorities, refused to sign it. It did not escape the
attention of some observers that refusal to comply with an order
of the Supreme Court was not unprecedented-some judges in
the South had refused to comply with such orders in
desegregation cases.1 45  Again, the issue of states' rights
provides the connection.
When all was said and done, the Casarottos never went to
arbitration but reached a settlement with DAI.1 46 One thing
that has always troubled me about this case is that the
Casarottos put these tremendous resources into their fight to
keep the dispute out of arbitration and get it into the courts in
Montana. Their claim was that the defendants allegedly made
an oral promise to move their franchise to a better site and then
broke that promise. In other words, the Casarottos wanted to
introduce parol evidence. Didn't their lawyers tell them that the
143. Casarotto III, 517 U.S. at 687 n.3.
144. Id. at 689.
145. Richard C. Reuben, Western Showdown: Two Montana Judges Buck the U.S.
Supreme Court, ABA J., Oct. 1996, at 16.
146. Telephone Interview with Paul Casarotto August 18, 2004. He had abandoned
the Subway franchise in 1992 and reached a settlement with DAI in 1998. He is now
operating a franchise (not Subway) in Delaware.
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Montana courts hate parol evidence almost as much as they
hate arbitration? 147  On that issue, one would think the
Casarottos would have been better off in arbitration, where, as
Justice Trieweiler acknowledged, the arbitrator often ignores
legal "technicalities" in order to reach a just result.
III. THE GUERILLA WAR CONTINUES
A. Iwen v. U.S. West Direct
For a while, it looked like the anti-arbitration forces were
routed. After the defeat in Casarotto, the Montana Legislature
deleted the notice requirement from Montana Code Annotated
section 27-5-114 in 1997.148 The war would continue
sporadically, however, with the Montana Supreme Court still
finding opportunities to express its hostility to arbitration.
The facts of Iwen v. U.S. West Direct149 seemed designed to
give arbitration a black eye. In Iwen, defendant U.S. West
screwed up plaintiff attorney's yellow pages advertisement.
When plaintiff brought suit, defendant claimed the dispute must
be submitted to arbitration under the parties' agreement, which
stated in pertinent part:
11. ARBITRATION. Any controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to this Agreement, or breach thereof, other than an action
by Publisher for the collection of the amounts due under this
Agreement, shall be settled by final, binding arbitration in
accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association, which rules are incorporated
herein by reference; provided, however, that any person
nominated to act as arbitrator is licensed to practice law before the
courts of the State where the arbitration is conducted. There shall
be one arbitrator to any arbitration. Judgment upon the award
rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction thereof. Venue for any arbitration under this provision
shall be at the office of the American Arbitration Association
closest to the Advertiser, or as such other location as the parties
may agree. 150
Having learned its lesson from Casarotto, the court knew that it
could strike an arbitration clause only, in the language of the
147. See Scott J. Burnham, The Parol Evidence Rule: Don't Be Afraid of the Dark,
55 MONT. L. REv. 93 (1994).
148. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114 (2003) (enacted in 1985, amended in 1997 to
remove notice requirement).
149. 1999 MT 63, 293 Mont. 512, 977 P.2d 989.
150. Id. 1 19 (emphasis added).
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Federal Arbitration Act, "upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."'151 One of the grounds
for revoking a contract, or a term of a contract, is
unconscionability. The court had previously examined the
unconscionability of an arbitration clause in Passage v.
Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.,152 and had stated a two-prong
test for the voidability of a clause in a contract of adhesion:
For such a contract or clause to be void, it must fall within
judicially imposed limits of enforcement. It will not be enforced
against the weaker party when it is: (1) not within the reasonable
expectations of said party, or (2) within the reasonable
expectations of the party, but, when considered in its context, is
unduly oppressive, unconscionable or against public policy. 153
Recall that these concepts-reasonable expectations and
unconscionability-are traditional grounds that exist in the law
for policing contracts. 54 Applying these concepts to the facts in
Iwen, the court had no trouble determining that the agreement
between Iwen and U.S. West was a contract of adhesion-it was
a standardized form previously prepared by U.S. West that was
not negotiable. Without looking at whether the arbitration
clause was within the reasonable expectations of Iwen, the court
examined whether it was unconscionable. The court stated
another two-prong test, this one for unconscionability:
Unconscionability in a contract is a concept introduced under the
Uniform Commercial Code and it has been applied to insurance
contracts. Unconscionability requires a two-fold determination:
that the contractual terms are unreasonably favorable to the
drafter and that there is no meaningful choice on the part of the
other party regarding acceptance of the provisions. 155
The court found unreasonably favorable terms in the
language of the arbitration clause that excepted from arbitration
"an action by Publisher for the collection of the amounts due
under this Agreement." 156 Correctly reasoning that virtually all
claims by US. West would be for collection, the court observed
that this provision had the effect of requiring Iwen to arbitrate
his claims while U.S. West was free to go to court on its
151. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
152. 223 Mont. 60, 727 P.2d 1298 (1986).
153. Id., 223 Mont. at 66, 727 P.2d at 1301-02.
154. See supra Part I.C.
155. Iwen, 31 (citing Leibrand v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty
Co., 272 Mont. 1, 898 P.2d 1220 (1995) (quoting Worldwide Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
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claims. 157 The term was therefore unconscionable because it
was unreasonably favorable to the drafter. By using a standard
contract defense that was not limited in application to
arbitration clauses, the court was able to strike the arbitration
clause without running afoul of Casarotto III.
This result seems correct, for while the court may be too
quick to find arbitration provisions objectionable, there indeed
are arbitration provisions that are unconscionable. Certainly
the parties are entitled to an arbitration provision that treats
them equally and that provides for a level playing field and a
neutral arbitrator. 158 But the Montana Supreme Court, having
found the concepts of reasonable expectations and
unconscionability useful for avoiding arbitration clauses, seemed
poised to unleash those new-found weapons rather freely.
B. The Battleground Shifts to Choice of Forum
The drafter of a contract who was aware of Montana's anti-
arbitration sentiment might simply include not only a choice of
law provision, specifying the law to be applied, but a choice of
forum provision, specifying the location where the dispute would
be heard. Recall that in Casarotto I, DAI did just that, including
in the contract a choice of forum clause that called for
arbitration in Connecticut. Justice Trieweiler made much of the
foreign forum at oral argument, when he alluded to the distance
the plaintiffs would have to travel to arbitrate, and in the
majority opinion in Casarotto I, he used the time and expense of
travel as a justification for Montana's statutory notice
requirement.159
Enforceability of the choice of forum clause, however, was
not an issue in Casarotto. Now it would be in Keystone, Inc. v.
Triad Systems Corp.160 Keystone, a Montana business that
distributed auto parts, contracted with Triad, a California
designer of computer systems, for the purchase of a $250,000
system. 161 After disputes arose about the operation of the
157. Id. See the italicized portion of the arbitration clause supra text accompanying
note 150.
158. See F. PAUL BLAND, JR. ET AL., CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS (3d ed.
2003).
159. Casarotto I, 268 Mont. 369, 376, 886 P.2d 931, 935, See supra text
accompanying note 98.
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system, Keystone brought suit in Montana. 162 Triad moved to
compel arbitration in California, pursuant to the terms of the
contract, which provided that the parties were "required to
arbitrate any dispute between them before the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) in San Francisco, California."'163
Keystone acknowledged that the dispute was subject to
arbitration, but moved to compel arbitration in Montana. 164
The district court upheld the parties' agreement, granting
Triad's motion to compel arbitration in California. 165
On appeal, Keystone claimed that the choice of forum
provision was void under Montana Code Annotated section 27-5-
323, the nonuniform amendment to the Uniform Arbitration Act
that provides in pertinent part:
Venue... No agreement concerning venue involving a resident of
this state is valid unless the agreement requires that arbitration
occur within the state of Montana. This requirement may only be
waived upon the advice of counsel as evidenced by counsel's
signature thereto. 166
The choice of forum provision would be void under this statute
only if Montana law applied to the transaction, however, and the
contract also contained a choice of law clause specifying
California law. To find the appropriate law governing the
contract, the court engaged in the same choice of law analysis it
employed in Casarotto I, with-not surprisingly-the same
result. Applying Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
section 188, the court determined that because Montana had a
materially greater interest in the contract, Montana law would
apply in the absence of an effective choice of law provision. As
long as it was looking to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws as authority, the court should have applied the rule that in
the case of the sale of goods, the place of delivery presumptively
governs. 167 Usually a seller of goods structures its contract so
that the place of delivery (e.g., the F.O.B. destination) is its own
place of business. It is possible that this seller did not do so. It
is also possible that in this mixed goods and services contract,






166. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-323 (2003).
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 191 (1971).
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The court then looked to Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws section 187, under which the chosen law-California law-
would govern the contract unless that law was contrary to a
fundamental public policy of the state whose law would govern
in the absence of that provision. Recall that in Casarotto I, the
court found that Connecticut policy was contrary to a
fundamental public policy of Montana because it did not require
notice of an arbitration clause. 168 In Keystone, the choice of law
clause was not effective because Montana found "strong public
policy considerations in Montana for voiding choice of forum
provisions."169
The court wisely avoided deciding the case on the basis of
Montana Code Annotated section 27-5-323, the statute that
requires that the venue of arbitration be Montana. Such a
determination would undoubtedly have fallen afoul of the
Federal Arbitration Act, for that Montana statute invalidates
choice of forum only in arbitration clauses and has the stringent
waiver requirement only with respect to arbitration clauses.
Instead, the court returned to Montana Code Annotated section
28-2-708, the statute that had historically voided pre-dispute
arbitration agreements: 170
Restraints upon legal proceedings void. Every stipulation or
condition in a contract by which any party thereto is restricted
from enforcing his rights under the contract by the usual
proceedings in the ordinary tribunals or which limits the time
within which he may thus enforce his rights is void. 171
The court found that this statute had "historically been
applied ... to protect Montana residents from having to litigate
outside of Montana."'172 It might be said that in reaching this
conclusion, the court was merely following precedent, as it
should do, and following the instructions of the legislature, as it
must do. Let us take a closer look at the cited statutes and
168. 268 Mont. at 376-77, 886 P.2d at 936.
169. Keystone, 13.
170. Supra note 67 and accompanying text.
171. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (1985) (originally enacted in Montana in 1895 as
section 2245 of the Montana Civil Code in the form above, amended in 1985 with
addition of new last sentence stating, "[t]his section does not affect the validity of an
agreement enforceable under Title 27, chapter 5.").
172. Keystone, 17. It is mildly curious that Montana does not object to choice of
venue clauses that place venue in Montana, See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-2-202 (2003).
The net effect of these policies is that a resident of Wibaux, Montana can't be compelled
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precedent to see if they support the outcome in Keystone. Does
the history of the statute confirm this conclusion? The original
Field Code contained this comment on the section: "The first
part of this section is acknowledged law. A covenant in a
contract, not to sue for a breach thereof, is void."173  If the
provision is merely saying you can't give up your right to sue for
breach of contract, it is a stretch to interpret it as saying you
can't give up your right to sue in Montana.
But in fact the precedents cited in Keystone do indeed state
that the statute is applicable to this situation, though the
history is neither long nor distinguished. The first precedent,
State ex rel. Polaris Industries, Inc. v. District Court,174 was
about as succinct as a decision comes; i.e, it is totally devoid of
analysis. After stating the facts and setting out the statute, the
court stated in toto:
The complaint of the plaintiff in this case comes within the
provisions of the foregoing code section [§ 28-2-708]. The plaintiff
seeks to enforce its right under its contract with Polaris by a
"usual proceeding" in the "ordinary tribunals" of Montana. We
hold that the forum-selection clause of the Agreement is void
under the statute as an improper restraint upon the plaintiffs
exercise of its rights.175
In the other cited precedent, Rindal v. Seckler, a federal
court had to decide whether the issue of forum selection was a
procedural issue, in which case it would be governed by federal
law, or a contract issue, in which case it would be governed by
state law under the Erie doctrine. 176 Having decided that state
law should govern, it was not too difficult for the court to
determine what the Montana law was. Citing Polaris, the court
found that the forum selection clause was invalid under the law
of Montana. 177
I don't have a problem with the court determining that
choice of forum clauses are contrary to public policy. I do have a
problem with the court not articulating what that policy is and
instead making what is at worst a tortured reading of a Field
Code statute and at best an incorrect interpretation of that
173. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 832
(Proposed Draft 1865).
174. 215 Mont. 110, 695 P.2d 471 (1985).
175. Id., 215 Mont. at 111, 695 P.2d at 472. Memo to Law Students: If your exam
answers contain this level of analysis, you will probably not make it through law school.
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statute to support its outcome. 178  This use of the statute
illustrates another weakness of the Field Code-that it has
frozen the common law as it stood more than 100 years ago and
does not permit change. There is a great deal of debate about
the enforcement of choice of forum clauses that the court might
have thoughtfully discussed. 179 Most significantly, this case
might have given the court an opportunity to distinguish
between contracts of adhesion and negotiated contracts, for in
Casarotto I the court promised not to "decline to enforce
arbitration agreements which are entered into knowingly"'80
while in Keystone the court mentioned during the choice of law
analysis that "the parties eventually entered into their contract
after many months of negotiation."'18 1
The decisions in Casarotto and Iwen were clearly rooted in a
court's power to police a contract of adhesion. In Keystone, on
the other hand, the court never alluded to the fact that it was
dealing with an arbitration clause in a negotiated commercial
contract. The distinction is significant, for if the court is not
exercising its police power, then it is simply overriding freedom
of contract in its haste to protect Montanans from arbitration.
The result is that in a contract governed by Montana law,
Montanans do not have the freedom to contract to have their
disputes resolved in another jurisdiction.
Having proceeded from a faulty premise to a foregone
conclusion, the court then forthrightly addressed whether the
Montana statutes were pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration
Act. Noting that Casarotto III requires that "state law may not
'place arbitration clauses on an unequal footing,' from general
contract provisions," the court concluded that because Montana
Code Annotated section 28-2-708 invalidated choice of forum
178. See Miller v. Fallon County, 222 Mont. 214, 721 P.2d 342 (1986); see also
Morriss, et al., supra note 25, at 396, as a particularly egregious example of this
phenomenon.
179. The trend seems to be toward enforcement of choice of forum clauses. See
Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision Limiting Place or
Court in Which Action May be Brought, 31 A.L.R.4th 404 (1984). California had enacted
the equivalent of Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-708 (2003) at California Civil
Code section 1672 in 1872, but it was quickly repealed the next year. See CAL. CIVIL
CODE § 1672 (2003). Today in California, "[a] forum selection clause in a contract will be
given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable." 13-140 CAL. FORMS OF PLEADING AND
PRACTICE ANNOTATED § 140.11 (2004). See also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,
499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, holding forum selection
clause in consumer contract enforceable).
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clauses in all contracts and not just in arbitration agreements, it
did not conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act.182
Furthermore, the result did not invalidate the parties'
agreement to arbitrate, but merely restricted where that
arbitration can take place. 183 This analysis seems correct.
184
Lurking in the background of these cases is a sleeping giant,
the Montana Constitution, which recognizes a right of access to
the courts of Montana. Article 2, Section 16 of the Montana
Constitution provides:
Section 16. The administration of justice. Courts of justice shall
be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every
injury of person, property, or character. No person shall be
deprived of this full legal redress for injury incurred in
employment for which another person may be liable except as to
fellow employees and his immediate employer who hired him if
such immediate employer provides coverage under the Workmen's
Compensation Laws of this state. Right and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial, or delay.185
In a concurring opinion in Polaris, Justice Sheehy argued that
the choice of forum clause also violated this provision of the
Constitution:
The provisions of Art. II, Section 16, 1972 Montana
Constitution, are further evidence of a strong public policy in this
State that impedances to state courts may not be countenanced by
us. The constitutional statement is that courts of justice shall be
open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury
of person, property or character. Forum selection clauses in
contracts impede the right to judicial process and especially
discourage a speedy remedy.186
Similarly, in Iwen, the court found that access to the judicial
system was a constitutional right, stating that "U.S. West Direct
pointedly protected itself by preserving its constitutional right of
access to the judicial system while at the same time completely
removed that right from the advertiser." 187 The court seemed to
be drawing nearer to addressing the circumstances under which
persons may waive their constitutional rights by agreeing to
182. Id. 25-27.
183. Id. 26.
184. One thoughtful commentator disagrees. See Bryan L. Quick, Keystone, Inc. v.
Triad Systems Corporation. Is the Montana Supreme Court Undermining the Federal
Arbitration Act? 63 MONT. L. REV. 445 (2002).
185. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16.
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submit their dispute to arbitration. 188
C. Ticknor v. Choice Hotels International, Inc.
Following Iwen and Keystone, the Montana Supreme Court
got confirmation from the Ninth Circuit that it was going to get
away with its application of traditional contract doctrine to
arbitration clauses. In Ticknor v. Choice Hotels International,
Inc.,18 9 the plaintiff Ticknors, in a transaction eerily reminiscent
of Casarotto, had entered into a franchise agreement with the
defendant operators of the Econo Lodge franchise to operate a
hotel in Bozeman. When disputes arose, the plaintiff went to
Montana district court and defendant moved the proceedings to
federal court, which took jurisdiction based on diversity.
Defendant claimed that the case should go to arbitration, under
an arbitration clause that specified arbitration of disputes in
Maryland, the location of defendant. 190 The federal district court
denied the motion to compel arbitration.191
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in a split decision of the panel.
The majority, in a decision by Judge Thomas joined by Judge
Pregerson, used the Montana choice of law rules as developed in
Keystone to determine what law applied, with the not-too-
surprising result that Montana law ended up being the chosen
law. First, the court upheld the district court's determination
that Montana had a materially greater interest than Maryland
in the transaction.1 92 So, according to the Restatement (Second)
188. In Nebraska, the Supreme Court held that Uniform Arbitration Act was
unconstitutional under the Nebraska Constitution, which provided that "[all courts
shall be open, and every person, for any injury done him in goods, person, or reputation
shall have a remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without denial or
delay." NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13 (amended 1996); State v. Neb. Ass'n of Pub. Employees,
477 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Neb. 1991). The people of Nebraska then rose up to amend the
constitution to specifically recognize arbitration. The amended Article 13 provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury done him or her in his
or her lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of
law and justice administered without denial or delay, except that the
Legislature may provide for the enforcement of mediation, binding arbitration
agreements, and other forms of dispute resolution which are entered into
voluntarily and which are not revocable other than upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13.
189. 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1133 (2002).
190. Id. at 935-36.
191. Id. at 936.
192. Id. at 938. The determination was upheld in spite of the fact that both the
majority and the dissent noted significant non-Montana contacts. Id. at 938, 942 n.1
186 Vol. 66
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of Conflict of Laws, if there were no choice of law provision,
Montana law would be applicable. 193 But the contract did have a
choice of law clause specifying Maryland law. According to the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, however, the specified
choice of law is not effective if "application of the law of the
chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy" of the
state that would otherwise have jurisdiction, i.e., Montana. 194
Recall that in Casarotto I, the Connecticut choice of law was
not effective because Connecticut did not have a statute that
had a notice provision and in Keystone, the California choice of
law was not effective because California did not have a statute
that provided for a local forum. So what was the contrary law of
Maryland in this case? The court never got there. With
commendable understatement, it found that "[t]he Montana
Supreme Court has taken a broad view of what constitutes
public policy, declaring that '[flor choice of law purposes, the
public policy of a state is simply the rules, as expressed in its
legislative enactments and judicial decisions, that it uses to
decide controversies."' 195 So if any difference between Montana
and Maryland law constitutes a fundamental policy, then what
is that difference? The court went on to say that "[i]n short, an
unconscionable arbitration clause in an adhesion contract is
unenforceable in Montana as a matter of public policy."'196 I
have not researched the issue, but if I were a betting man, I
would wager that it is also the law of Maryland that "an
unconscionable arbitration clause in an adhesion contract is
unenforceable," so it is hard to see any difference there. The
court followed that statement by stating that "the Montana
Supreme Court would likely hold that another state's contrary
interpretation of contract unconscionability would contradict a
fundamental public policy of Montana."' 97 It is undoubtedly true
that the Montana Supreme Court would so find, but is that a
difference between Maryland law and Montana law? Rather
than analyzing any difference, the majority seems to have cut to
the chase and concluded that since the Montana Supreme Court
would find a way to find the arbitration clause unenforceable, so
(Tashima, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 938 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188).
194. Id. at 937 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OFLAWS § 187(2)(b)).
195. Ticknor, 265 F.3d at 938 (quoting Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2000 MT 55,
75, 298 Mont. 438, T 75, 995 P.2d 1002, 75).
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must a court applying Montana law.
Having decided that Montana law applied, it was no great
leap for the court to conclude that the arbitration agreement
would be held unenforceable under Montana law. 198 But would
such a hypothetical action by the Montana Supreme Court be
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act? No, the majority
said, because under the limitations of the Federal Arbitration
Act as recognized in Casarotto III, "Montana law pertaining to
the unconscionability of arbitration clauses was the result of the
'application of general principles that exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract."' 199
Judge Tashima wrote a thoughtful dissent. For purposes of
the dissent, he assumed arguendo that Montana law would
apply in the absence of the parties' agreement and that the
judicially created rule striking down one-sided arbitration
clauses in contracts of adhesion did not run afoul of Casarotto
111.200 But he questioned whether this transaction involved a
contract of adhesion, for it was a business transaction that was
negotiated between experienced business people. 201 And even if
it was a contract of adhesion, he did not find the arbitration
clause to be the kind of provision that "shocked the conscience"
of the court, which should be the standard for
unconscionability.2 2 Judge Tashima apparently found that the
case involved parties who exercised their freedom of contract to
choose Maryland law.20 3
In upholding the avoidance of the arbitration clause under
general principles of contract law, it appears at first blush that
the court in Ticknor was simply exercising the traditional police
power of the court to overcome freedom of contract in instances
of unconscionability. But it seems that a more narrow principle
was being applied-the reality that arbitration clauses will
always be found unconscionable in Montana. If that is the case,
then it appears that the court did not heed the warning
contained in footnote three to Casarotto III: "It bears reiteration,
however, that a court may not 'rely on the uniqueness of an
agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that
198. Id. at 941.
199. Id. at 941 (quoting Iwen, 34).
200. Id. at 942 n.1 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
201. Ticknor, 265 F.3d at 942-43.
202. Id. at 944 (citing Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir.
2001)).
203. Id. at 942-55.
188 Vol. 66
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enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the
court to effect what ... the state legislature cannot.' 20 4 But, you
say, even emboldened by Ticknor, surely the Montana Supreme
Court would not find all arbitration clauses unconscionable?
IV. THE WAR IS OVER-ARBITRATION HAS LOST
In Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 205 plaintiff, a 95-year-old
widow20 6 had done business since 1985 with defendant
brokerage house through stockbroker Paul Husted.2 7  She
opened a full service account in 1989 which permitted her to
purchase securities. In 1992, she established a living trust.
Both agreements contained mandatory arbitration clauses. In
1998, Kloss set up a charitable trust on the recommendation of
Husted and executed another agreement with a mandatory
arbitration clause. She did not sign this agreement, but signed
a detachable card acknowledging that she received a copy of the
agreement. The card incorporated an arbitration clause by
reference. The agreements contained the following language:
ARBITRATION
1. Arbitration is final and binding on the parties.
2. The parties are waiving their right to seek remedies in court,
including the right to jury trial.
3. Pre-arbitration discovery is generally more limited than and
different from court proceedings.
4. The arbitrators' awards is not required to include factual
findings or legal reasoning, and any party's right to appeal or to
seek modification of rulings by the arbitrators is strictly limited.
5. The panel of arbitrators will typically include a minority of
arbitrators who were or are affiliated with the securities
industry. 20 8
Kloss then sued in district court to revoke the charitable trust
and Edward Jones moved to compel arbitration.20 9
The court, in an opinion written by Justice Trieweiler and
concurred in by Justices Cotter, Nelson, and Leaphart, grounded
its decision in the doctrine of reasonable expectations. The court
first discussed and distinguished two precedents in which it had
204. 517 U.S. at 687 n.3 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)).
205. 2002 MT 129, 310 Mont. 123, 54 P.3d 1, cert. denied, 538 U.S. 956 (2003).
206. End of necessary facts.
207. Id. 6-9.
208. Id. T 9.
209. Id. 1 12.
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found arbitration clauses in brokerage contracts enforceable:
Passage v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.,210 and Chor v.
Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc.211 It is interesting to travel back
in time to the pre-Casarotto world of those cases. In Passage,
Justice Weber's opinion began by showing deference to the
Supreme Court's decision in Southland.212 It then extensively
quoted from Finkle and Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc.,213 a
New York federal case, on the issue of when arbitration clauses
in contracts of adhesion are enforceable:
Contracts of adhesion arise when a standardized form of
agreement, usually drafted by the party having superior
bargaining power, is presented to a party, whose choice is either to
accept or reject the contract without the opportunity to negotiate
its terms. [citation omitted.] Here, the investor is faced with an
industry wide practice of including Arbitration Clauses in
standardized brokerage contracts. As the investor faces the
possibility of being excluded from the securities market unless he
accepts a contract with such an agreement to arbitrate, such
clauses come within the adhesion doctrine. However, mere
inequality in bargaining power does not render a contract
unenforcible, [citation omitted] nor are all standardized contracts
unenforcible. [citations omitted.] As a consequence of current
commercial realities, form forum clauses will control, absent a
strong showing it should be set aside. [citation omitted.] For such
a contract or clause to be void, it must fall within judicially
imposed limits of enforcement. It will not be enforced against the
weaker party when it is: (1) not within the reasonable expectations
of said party or (2) within the reasonable expectations of the party,
but, when considered in its context, is unduly oppressive,
unconscionable or against public policy. [citations omitted.]
Such pre-dispute arbitration agreements are not outside the
reasonable expectations of the investor. [citation omitted.] Nor
are they contrary to public policy, as indicated by the judicial and
legislative presumption favoring the arbitration of such disputes.
[citation omitted.]2 14
Applying these rules to the facts, the Passage court quickly
concluded that there was no evidence to indicate that the
arbitration clause was not within the party's reasonable
expectations or was unconscionable. 21 5 Five justices concurred
210. 223 Mont. 60, 727 P.2d 1298 (1986).
211. 261 Mont. 143, 862 P.2d 26 (1993).
212. 223 Mont. at 63-64, 727 P.2d at 1300.
213. 622 F. Supp. 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
214. Passage, 223 Mont. at 66, 727 P.2d at 1301-02 (quoting Finkle and Ross v. A.G.
Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505, 1511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
215. Id., 223 Mont. at 66, 727 P.2d at 1302.
Vol. 66
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in this opinion while only one, Justice Morrison, dissented.
Curiously, this same passage from Finkle and Ross was quoted
in Kloss, except that the last paragraph was omitted and it was
cited on the issue of when arbitration clauses in contracts of
adhesion are unenforceable rather than when they are
enforceable. 216
Chor was decided just a year before Casarotto I, but what a
difference a year makes! One of the curious facts of Chor is that
a National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Rule
required that a broker obtain from a customer an
acknowledgment of receipt of the arbitration agreement-in
other words, evidence that the customer had notice that the
agreement contained an arbitration provision. Justice Turnage,
joined by two other justices, found that there was no such
acknowledgment of one of the arbitration agreements, rendering
that one invalid.217  The court then found that the other
arbitration agreements did not violate the doctrines of
reasonable expectations and unconscionability. 218  Justice
Nelson, with Justice Gray concurring, dissented on the first
issue, arguing that the violation of the NASD Rule should result
in sanctions against the dealer but should not affect the validity
of the arbitration clause!219 Justice Trieweiler, in a dissent
joined by Justice Hunt, argued that because it was overly broad,
the arbitration clause was not within Chor's reasonable
expectations and was unconscionable. 220 The dissent also found
that the overly broad provision violated Montana Code
Annotated section 28-2-708 and the notice requirement of
section 27-5-114, which was not mentioned by the majority.221
Nor did the majority discuss the district court's finding that the
"effect of waiving the right to trial by jury" would be
unconscionable, but the dissent agreed that Chor had been
deprived of her constitutional rights:
With court dockets being as overcrowded as they are, the rush
of the federal judiciary and this Court to embrace arbitration is
understandable. However, the majority's willingness to, in the
process, ignore fundamental constitutional rights such as access to
216. Kloss, 24.
217. Chor v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 261 Mont. 143, 148, 862 P.2d 26, 29
(1983).
218. Id., 261 Mont. at 149-50, 862 P.2d at 30-31.
219. Id., 261 Mont. at 153-54, 862 P.2d at 33 (Nelson and Gray, JJ., concurring).
220. Id., 261 Mont. at 159-60, 862 P.2d at 36 (Trieweiler and Hunt, JJ., dissenting).
221. Id., 261 Mont. at 156, 862 P.2d at 34 (Trieweiler and Hunt, JJ., dissenting).
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our courts and the right to jury trial, is not so understandable.2 22
The Koss court explained that "[i]n Chor ... [w]e also held
that the arbitration provision was clearly within Chor's
reasonable expectations based on her own testimony that she
understood her obligation to arbitrate based on her review of the
agreement."223 The court then distinguished the facts in Kioss,
explaining that the arbitration provision was not within Kloss's
reasonable expectations because "Kloss did not read the contract
and was not aware of the arbitration provision in the
contract. ' 224 This statement suggests a misreading of Chor but,
more importantly-if it is saying that one can't claim the benefit
of the doctrine of reasonable expectations if one has read the
contract term-it badly misstates the doctrine. 225 First of all, in
Chor, the plaintiff claimed that she had read the documents but
had a misunderstanding of them and claimed that her
understanding governed. The Chor court properly stated that "a
party cannot avoid the legal consequences of an agreement
simply by later claiming that she did not understand the impact
of the plain language of the contract on her legal rights."226
Most importantly, the court's implication that Kloss had not
read the contract and therefore could still claim the benefit of
reasonable expectations doctrine misses the point of the
doctrine. Reasonable expectations are not actual expectations.
To see why this is an important distinction, let's take a closer
look at the doctrine.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the
doctrine of reasonable expectations applies because a person
"has reason to believe that like writings are regularly used to
embody terms of agreements of the same type. '227 In other
words, when one enters into a standard form contract, like a
brokerage contract, the person has certain expectations of the
222. Id., 261 Mont. at 160, 862 P.2d at 37 (Trieweiler and Hunt, JJ., dissenting).
223. Kloss, 26.
224. Id. 28.
225. The court compounded the confusion about reasonable expectations in
Arrowhead School District No. 75 v. Klyap, 2003 MT 294, 318 Mont. 103, 79 P.3d 250,
where it made such statements as "such contracts [form contracts] are only
unconscionable if the terms are not within the reasonable expectation of the party who
had no opportunity to negotiate." Id. 61. This is a misstatement. If a term is not
within reasonable expectations, then it is not within reasonable expectations, but it is
not necessarily unconscionable.
226. 261 Mont. at 149, 862 P.2d at 30 (citing Wright v. Blevins, 217 Mont. 439, 444,
705 P.2d 113, 117 (1985)).
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(1) (1981).
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usual terms that such an agreement contains. It therefore
follows that if the drafter incorporates unusual provisions, those
provisions are presumptively not part of the agreed terms. This
doctrine makes practical sense in an age of form contracts. But
it also makes sense that a person should not be penalized for
actually reading the document. If that were the case, then there
would be an incentive to remain ignorant. So the rule properly
provides that all parties are treated the same whether they read
and understood the agreement or not.228 The Chor majority
seemed to get this, for under the doctrine, her subjective
understanding would not be relevant. Justice Trieweiler's
dissent seemed to get it too, for if the agreement were so broad
as to cover the arbitration of transactions other than the ones
made under the agreement, that would not be within reasonable
expectations, and Chor's understanding of it would not matter.
On the other hand, the trial court judge in Kloss apparently
found that "the arbitration provision was within Kloss's
reasonable expectation simply because it was contained in the
contract. 229 Mere inclusion of the provision in the contract, as
the supreme court correctly pointed out, is not enough to bring a
provision within reasonable expectations, for then every
provision would qualify.230 So what does it take to bring a
contract provision within the scope of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations? First of all, it takes a provision that, according to
the Comments to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, "is
bizarre or oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates the non-
standard terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it
eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction."23 1 Did the
court properly apply this standard in Kioss? The court stated
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981) provides:
Standardized Agreements
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or
otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like
writings are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the same type,
he adopts the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the terms
included in the writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all
those similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of
the standard terms of the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term,
the term is not part of the agreement.
229. Kloss, 29.
230. Id.
231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (1981).
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that:
[Tihe arbitration provision by which Kloss waived her right of
access to this State's courts, her right to a jury trial, her right to
reasonable discovery, her right to findings of fact based on the
evidence, and her right to enforce the law applicable to her case by
way of appeal were clearly not within Kloss' reasonable
expectations. 2 32
This reasoning makes sense only if an arbitration clause always
satisfies the "bizarre or oppressive" standard-a determination
that the court, because of its hostility to arbitration, apparently
believes is self-evident, because it did not further elaborate.
But the court failed to continue the reasonable expectations
analysis. Once it is determined that a provision is "bizarre or
oppressive," can the drafter make the provision enforceable?
The answer is yes. If the evil of the provision is that it is not
reasonably expected, the cure is to make it reasonable expected.
How? By giving notice of it! It then falls within the reasonable
expectations of the other party. This makes sense because we
know that one will not read all the provisions of a form contract,
but the attention of the reasonable reader can at least be called
to the bizarre or oppressive provisions. The drafter
accomplishes this goal by putting those provisions in bold print,
in a contrasting color, or, the wise guy reader is no doubt
thinking, in underlined capital letters on the first page of the
contract. 233 The majority in Kloss did not address this element
of reasonable expectations, presumably because the drafter did
call the provision to a reasonable person's attention.234 If the
232. Koss, 1 28.
233. For example, the Dell, Inc. "Terms and Conditions of Sale" for a computer look
like this:
U.S. Terms and Conditions of Sale
PLEASE READ THIS DOCUMENT CAREFULLY IT CONTAINS VERY
IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS, AS WELL AS LIMITATIONS AND EXCLUSIONS THAT
MAY APPLY TO YOU. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS A DISPUTE
RESOLUTION CLAUSE.
These terms and conditions ("Agreement") apply to your purchase of computer
systems and/or related products and/or services and support sold in the United
States ("Product") by the Dell entity named on the invoice or acknowledgement
("Dell") provided to you.
Dell Online Policies, Terms and Conditions of Sale, available at
http://wwwI.us.dell.comlcontent/topics/globa.aspx/policy/en/policy?c=us&l=en&s=gen&-
ck=lf&-section=012 (visited August 27, 2004).
234. In a concurring opinion, Justice Leaphart raised the additional fact that Koss
signed a detachable signature card that stated that she was aware of the pre-dispute
arbitration clause before she received the agreement containing the language of waiver.
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problem with the provision was its form, then the court, without
analysis of the content, was determining that a contract of
adhesion is per se unconscionable. 235 If the problem with the
provision was its substance rather than its form, then the court
was really analyzing it under the doctrine of unconscionability
and effectively determining that all arbitration clauses are
unconscionable. In fact, the court then went on to complete
exactly this analysis in dicta.
Having decided the case on the grounds of reasonable
expectations-or at least the doctrine of reasonable expectations
as the court comprehended the doctrine-the court then said it
did not need to determine whether the arbitration clause was
unconscionable. However, it prepared attorneys for future cases
by stating that the issue of whether an arbitration clause was
unconscionable would be determined by looking at a number of
factors:
Furthermore, as a guide to future litigants who raise the issue of
conscionability in the context of arbitration provisions, we take
this opportunity to state that that issue cannot be decided without
a more fully developed record. We have set forth the factors to be
considered in Iwen, however, a number of factual issues should be
addressed before those factors can be appropriately applied. For
Therefore the waiver of rights, which she received later and did not sign, could not have
been within her reasonable expectations since it was not called to her attention. Kloss,
46-47. Justice Rice agreed with this concurring opinion but not with the majority
opinion. This reasoning, while consistent with the doctrine of reasonable expectations,
would not have served the majority's purpose, for such a narrow holding could easily be
distinguished in future cases when the arbitration provision was called to the attention
of the other party at the time they signed the agreement.
235. One commentator thought the court did exactly this and found the decision
"unique" in the law of contracts:
The court emphasized that its holding was not based on a finding that the
arbitration clause was unconscionable since unconscionability would require a
complete analysis of the operation and effect of the arbitration clause in this
case to determine whether it was oppressive. It would not, however, be unfair
to construe the court's analysis as refusing to enforce the arbitration clause on
the grounds of what other courts would characterize as procedural
unconscionability, albeit the clause, itself, may be substantively conscionable.
In this light, the court's analysis would suggest an uncommon holding, i.e., the
refusal to enforce a provision because of procedural unconscionability alone.
Courts typically suggest that unconscionability requires both procedural
(bargaining imperfection) and substantive (oppression) elements. Courts may
be moved to find a clause unenforceable because of substantive
unconscionability alone. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d
246, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998); Maxwell v. Fidelity Financial Services,
Inc., 184 Ariz. 82, 907 P. 2d 51 (1995). Holding a clause unenforceable on the
sole basis of procedural unconscionability, however, would be unique.
1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4, at 3 (LexisNexis Supp. Spring 2004).
57
Burnham: The War Against Arbitration in Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2005
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
example:
1. Are potential arbitrators disproportionately employed in
one or the other party's field of business?
2. Do arbitrators tend to favor "repeat players" as opposed to
workers or consumers who are unlikely to be involved in
arbitration again? In other words, is there a tendency by
arbitrators to avoid decisions which will result in the loss of
future contracts for their services?
3. What are the filing fees for arbitration compared to the
filing fees in Montana's district courts?
4. What are arbitrators' fees? Do they make small claims
prohibitive? Do they discriminate against consumers or
workers of modest means?
5. Are arbitration proceedings shrouded in secrecy so as to
conceal illegal, oppressive or wrongful business practices?
6. To what extent are arbitrators bound by the law?
7. To what extent are arbitrators bound by the facts?
8. What opportunity do claimants have to discover the facts
necessary to prove a claim such as a company's business
practices? 23
6
Is it possible to draft an arbitration clause that will not be
deemed unconscionable under these criteria? I don't think so,
for many of the criteria are simply descriptive of arbitration. It
is, for example, generally thought of as a strength of arbitration
that it does not involve complex discovery and procedural rules.
Factor 6, "[T]o what extent are arbitrators bound by the law?" is
especially troubling. The implication is that arbitration is
unconscionable if the arbitrator is, to a great extent, not bound
by the law. Yet that is the standard in arbitration, as provided
by statute in Montana. 237
As if that weren't enough to kill arbitration dead, Justice
Nelson then added a specially concurring opinion. He described
236. Koss, 30.
237. Montana Code Annotated section 27-5-312(2) (2003) provides, "[t]he fact that
the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is
not grounds for vacating or refusing to confirm the award." Perhaps the court was
referring to statutory claims, yet even those are subject to arbitration as long as the
arbitration preserves the substantive rights under the statute. See Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002) (holding
an arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable because the agreement forced
the employee to arbitrate his statutory claims without affording him the benefit of the
full range of statutory remedies). Interestingly, in 2003, the Georgia legislature
amended the Georgia Arbitration Code to allow an arbitrator's award to be vacated upon
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adhesion contracts in the following terms:
Likewise, these are the adhesion contracts that, as in the case sub
judice, ordinary citizens and small business people are compelled
to sign if they want to participate in the national/global economy,
the profits of which fuel the very existence and growth of these
same national and multi-national corporations (and the election
and re-election of their benefactors in government). 238
In this opinion, Justice Nelson provided "an additional rationale
supporting our decision in this case-i.e., whether Kloss
effectively waived her rights to a trial by jury and to access to
the courts by executing Jones's 1992 and 1998 standard-form
contracts." 239 This concurring opinion was joined by the same
judges that signed the opinion. Because Justice Trieweiler's
majority opinion cited the constitutional rights that Kloss gave
up, the strong implication is that there is an alternative basis
for the holding. In other words, a majority of the court appears
to find that the rights of jury trial and access to the courts under
the Montana Constitution apply to private transactions. 240
Justice Nelson suggested in a footnote that "other constitutional
rights may be implicated in these sorts of cases, including the
right to due process of law (Article II, Section 17, Montana
Constitution) and equal protection of the laws (Article II, Section
4, Montana Constitution). '241
Justice Nelson forcefully argued that if a party to a
transaction surrenders constitutional rights, then there must be
a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. For this
purpose he cited many authorities, from Blackstone to Montana
238. Koss, 62 (Nelson, J., concurring).
239. Id. 48 (Nelson, J., concurring).
240. In the U.S. Constitution, there is no right of access to the courts as such.
There is a right to trial by jury in the Seventh Amendment. In Allstar Homes, Inc. v.
Waters, 711 So. 2d 924 (Ala. 1997), the Alabama Supreme Court held that "any
arbitration agreement is a waiver of a party's right under Amendment VII of the United
States Constitution to a trial by jury and, regardless of the federal courts' policy favoring
arbitration, we find nothing in the FAA that would permit such a waiver unless it is
made knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily." Id. at 929. On the other hand, in Cooper v.
MRM Investment Co., 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2004), the Sixth Circuit held that "[t]he
Seventh Amendment confers not the right to a jury trial per se, but rather only the right
to have a jury hear the case once it is determined that the litigation should proceed
before a court. If the claims are properly before an arbitral forum pursuant to an
arbitration agreement, the jury trial right vanishes." Id. at 506 (quoting Bank One, N.A.
v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 834 (S.D. Miss. 2001), affd, 34 Fed. App. 964 (5th Cir.
2002)).
241. Kloss, 48 n.1 (Nelson, J., concurring). The implications for private
commercial transactions are staggering to comprehend.
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cases.242 Curiously, all of this authority lauding the importance
of trial by jury involves the waiver of those rights in criminal
cases. This is curious because in those cases the right is a shield
against the power of the state to deprive a person of freedom. 243
Here, however, the state is using its power to deprive citizens of
their cherished freedom of contract. It appears that there is no
transaction that the Montana Constitution won't apply to, from
the sale of land244 to the giving of an engagement ring,245 to a
contract containing an arbitration clause. The Montana
Constitution is now a mega-regulation, allowing the court rather
than private ordering by the parties subject to legislation in the
public interest to determine all rules of law.246 It is ironic that
this results from a document intended to limit the power of the
state.2
47
Justice Nelson acknowledged that it is possible for a person
to effectively waive those constitutional rights and, like Justice
Trieweiler in the majority opinion with respect to
unconscionability, he provided the attorney with some guidance
for determining whether there has been an effective waiver:
In applying these well-settled principles of law in the context of
the issue presented here, a reviewing court must consider a
totality of overlapping and non-exclusive factors including:
242. Id. 54 (Nelson, J., concurring).
243. It makes no sense that the court should be so enthusiastic about upholding the
Article II right of access to the courts in cases involving private parties while permitting
the state to take away that right. For example, the state's right to compel arbitration in
the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, Montana Code Annotated
section 39-2-914 (2003), was held constitutional in Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 238
Mont. 21, 776 P.2d 488 (1989). Justice Nelson recognized this anomaly in Koss, strongly
suggesting that Meech will be overturned when the opportunity arises. Kloss, 59 ("I do
not see how these decisions can be squared with, much less continue to exist beside, this
Court's jurisprudence holding that other Article II rights are fundamental rights").
244. Cape-France Enters. v. Estate of Peed, 2001 MT 139, 305 Mont. 513, 29 P.3d
1011. See Chase Naber, Murky Waters: Private Action and the Right to a Clean and
Healthful Environment, An Examination of Cape-France Enterprises v. Estate of Peed,
64 MONT. L. REV. 357 (2003).
245. Albinger v. Harris, 2002 MT 118, 310 Mont. 27, 48 P.3d 711.
246. Justice Nelson's reasoning makes us wonder, for example, whether all Article
II rights (except where expressly stated otherwise) apply between citizens and not just
between a citizen and the state. What about secured transactions? Does the right of due
process apply to the taking of property pursuant to a security interest? Does merely
stating, as most security agreements do, "I hereby grant lender a security interest in X,"
constitute a waiver? Would that be enough to create an effective waiver in a consumer
goods transaction?
247. The process has hardly begun. At the 2003 University of Montana School of
Law Hooding Ceremony, commencement speaker Justice Nelson advised graduating law
students that the state Constitution is "a rich vein just waiting to be mined."
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whether there were any actual negotiations over the waiver
provision;
whether the clause was included on a take-it-or-leave-it basis as
part of a standard-form contract;
whether the waiver clause was conspicuous and explained the
consequences of the provision (e.g. waiver of the right to trial by
jury and right of access to the courts);
whether there was disparity in the bargaining power of the
contracting parties;
whether there was a difference in business experience and
sophistication of the parties;
whether the party charged with the waiver was represented by
counsel at the time the agreement was executed;
whether economic, social or practical duress compelled a party to
execute the contract (e.g. where a consumer needs phone service
and the only company or companies providing that service require
execution of an adhesion contract with a binding arbitration clause
before service will be extended);
whether the agreement was actually signed or the waiver
provision separately initialed;
whether the waiver clause was ambiguous or misleading; and
whether the party with the superior bargaining power lulled the
inferior party into a belief that the waiver would not be
enforced. 248
Needless to say, few arbitration provisions could qualify
under the standards of reasonable expectations,
unconscionability, and waiver enunciated in Koss. Just in case
there are any out there, however, Justice Nelson has been
crisscrossing the state, presenting a Continuing Legal Education
program in which he further elaborates on the standards the
court has set. This is an excerpt from Justice Nelson's CLE
outline:
V. Status of contractual waivers of fundamental rights in
adhesion contracts after Koss?
A. Arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts must be within
the reasonable expectations of the party compelled to
arbitrate.
B. A party seeking to void the arbitration clause on the basis
of oppression or unconscionability must develop the record
with sufficient specific facts to demonstrate why and how the
clause meets those criteria.
248. Koss, 65 (Nelson, J., concurring).
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C. Where arbitration clause requires forfeiture of
constitutional rights - right of trial by jury and right of access
to the courts - the waiver must be shown to have been made
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently and the waiving
language must be expressed unequivocally and
unambiguously. Again, the record must demonstrate the
waiver by proof and consideration of a totality of various
specific, non-exclusive and overlapping factors.249
The message seems to be: if you are so foolish as to think you
can avoid the court system by putting an arbitration clause in
your contract, think again. The brilliance of the Kloss decision
is that it avoids the pitfalls of Casarotto by basing its reasoning
on fundamental principles of contract law. Perhaps tired of
fighting, the United States Supreme Court refused to grant
certiorari in this case.250
V. CONCLUSION
Inevitably a national corporation, like the Subway sandwich
franchisor in Casarotto, will not tailor its arbitration clause or
its waiver of rights to the requirements the Montana Supreme
Court enumerated in Kloss and the arbitration provision will be
struck down. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Casarotto that
the legislature could not enact provisions that restrict
arbitration in that situation. And in footnote three to that case,
it warned the courts not to do what the legislature may not do.251
But the Montana Supreme Court has now accomplished what
the legislature was unable to do-the regulation if not the
prohibition of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in Montana. It is
possible that the higher court will right this wrong, or even that
a reconstituted Montana Supreme Court will see things
differently. Until that time, however, arbitration is dead in
Montana.
Is its death something to mourn? Let's start with the
widely shared premise that the U.S. Supreme Court took a
wrong turn in Southland v. Keating. It should never have held
that the Federal Arbitration Act is applicable to the states. But
249. Hon. James C. Nelson, ' Before Signing That Contract, You Must Understand
Your Rights..." Contractual Waivers of Fundamental Rights in Contracts of Adhesion
After Moss, Outline of address given at the State Bar of Montana Continuing Legal
Education Seminar (Jan. 18, 2003) (copy on file with the author).
250. 538 U.S. 956 (2003).
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that decision is water over the dam and our courts have to live
with it. Alternatively, they can fight it by lobbing assorted
weapons at it, but weapons unsuited for the job have a way of
landing without precision and taking a toll among bystanders.
252
One of those bystanders is freedom of contract, which has been
seriously wounded in Montana.
It must be hard for the Montana Supreme Court to imagine
that someone would actually prefer arbitration to court, but the
preference isn't so hard to comprehend. Arbitration is
frequently "just, speedy, and inexpensive." 253 Those procedural
and evidentiary "protections," so dear to the heart of the court,
are not nearly so popular with litigants. People who are
wronged are often happy if they can get someone to listen to
their story, and all those protections often get in the way of
storytelling. 254
The mere fact that there is so much arbitration indicates
that the system is working. One might argue that arbitration is
not really preferred, but is forced on the little guy by the big
business. That may be true, but don't the efficiencies of the
business work to the benefit of the customers as well as to the
owners of the business? And if enough customers expressed
displeasure with arbitration, wouldn't a business compete by
offering the service of taking its customers to court instead of to
arbitration?255
My good friend Chuck Knapp has also given thought to
arbitration and comes to different conclusions than I do, which
should give me pause. 256 Seeing arbitration as a black hole
down which all contract law is being sucked, Knapp states:
252. Two superlative law review articles that debate these issues are Paul D.
Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, and
Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a
Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 195 (1998).
253. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
254. A classic example is Casarotto, where the parol evidence rule would have
prevented the Casarottos from telling their story in court while an arbitrator likely
would have heard it. See supra text accompanying note 147.
255. It must be noted that most of the arbitrations that result from the arbitration
clause contained in agreements such as credit card contracts are merely debt collections.
The consumer rarely has a defense and an electronic, paper, or telephonic arbitration is
certainly a far less costly procedure for everyone than a court action. Does the court
system really want to process all of these cases? Does Justice Nelson really want banks
to advertise, "Do business with us. We are the friendly folks who sue our customers
when we have a dispute!"
256. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract
Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (2002).
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"[Mlandatory" arbitration-arbitration imposed by pre-dispute
clauses in contracts of adhesion which, as a practical matter, the
non-drafting parties have no real power to avoid or disapprove-
will, if allowed to continue unchecked, largely deprive American
courts of the ability to play the important social role they played
so effectively throughout the last century. And it will take away,
from those individuals and enterprises who need it most, the
protection of the law. Whatever else arbitration may be, it is not
"law"-the kind of findable, studiable, arguable, appealable,
Restateable kind of law that has characterized the Contract area
for over a century. The piece-by-piece dismantling of American
contract law is happening under our noses, right now. Maybe this
process cannot be stopped, but at least we should recognize it for
what it is: the abdication of any public responsibility for justice
based on something more than raw economic power. 257
Among other solutions to this problem, 258 Knapp sees hope in
the liberal application of the doctrine of unconscionability. 25259
Having seen this approach used by the Montana Supreme
Court, I am wary of it. I am reminded of the abiding dilemma
257. Id. at 766.
258. Knapp's suggestions include improving the cost and structure of arbitration,
increasing the remedies available through arbitration, requiring arbitrators' decisions to
be written and reviewable, and making genuine the voluntariness of agreements to
arbitrate. Id. at 790-795.
259. Knapp cites approvingly the Ninth Circuit case of Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002). Id. at 769 n.32. Adams gets off to a shaky start,
with the court's unconscionability analysis beginning:
The [Circuit City Dispute Resolution Agreement] is procedurally
unconscionable because it is a contract of adhesion: a standard-form contract,
drafted by the party with superior bargaining power, which relegates to the
other party the option of either adhering to its terms without modification or
rejecting the contract entirely. [Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th
1519, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 (1997)] at 145-46 (indicating that a contract of
adhesion is procedurally unconscionable). Circuit City, which possesses
considerably more bargaining power than nearly all of its employees or
applicants, drafted the contract and uses it as its standard arbitration
agreement for all of its new employees. The agreement is a prerequisite to
employment, and job applicants are not permitted to modify the agreement's
terms - they must take the contract or leave it.
Adams, 279 F.3d at 893.
If that were all it took to satisfy unconscionability analysis, 99.99% of contracts
would be unconscionable, for the court in that passage describes most of the contracts we
encounter in everyday life. Justice Nelson would be in hog heaven but a more tempered
view might see the unconscionability exception swallowing up the rule of contracts.
Fortunately, the court then undertook an analysis of substantive unconscionability,
reasonably finding that this was an unconscionable provision because, it did not require
the employer to arbitrate claims against the employee and it limited the remedies
available to the employee. Adams, at 893-95. This analysis is similar to the analysis of
the Montana Supreme Court in Iwen v. U.S. West Direct., 1999 MT 63, 293 Mont. 512,
977 P.2d 989, discussed supra Part III.A. As with Iwen, I have no quarrel with Adams
as employing unconscionability to defeat an arbitration clause.
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concerning our freedom of speech-in order to preserve it, do we
suppress the speech of those who would take it away? For it
may be that the Montana Supreme Court's war on arbitration is
destroying the very freedom that it is trying to preserve. 260
I'm not an economist, but I play one in class. I'm a professor
of contract law, and like Moliere's gentleman who discovered
that he had been speaking prose, 261 I frequently discover that I
have been speaking economics. And apparently free-market
economics, for I have come to appreciate the glory of freedom of
contract. Freedom of contract is, despite its lack of public
awareness, a core freedom because it is at the heart of the free
enterprise system. That system depends on millions of
agreements that set not only the price of goods and services, but
the other terms that govern buying and selling.
The system is, of course, subject to government regulation.
Often that regulation exists to correct an inefficiency in the
system that makes the system less competitive. Anti-monopoly
and anti-fraud regulation would fit into that category. Other
regulation is designed to facilitate disclosure, so that people may
have the information they need to make the market function
more effectively. It might be nice if all contract terms were
"knowingly" agreed to. We might then attain that "meeting of
the minds" hitherto available only on the planet Vulcan. But
knowledge of all terms is a fantasy, and a costly one to
perpetuate.262
260. The issue was captured nicely in an exchange between Bassanio and Portia in
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 4, sc. 1. Bassanio is trying to
persuade Portia, the judge, not to enforce the contract in which his friend Antonio has
agreed to lose a pound of flesh as damages for breach:
Bassanio: To do a great right, do a little wrong.
Portia: It must not be; there is no power in Venice
Can alter a decree established:
'Twill be recorded for a precedent,
And many an error by the same example
Will rush into the state: it cannot be.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 4, sc. 1.
261. JEAN BAPTISTE MOLIERE, THE BOURGEOIS GENTLEMAN, act 2, sc. 4.
262. 'Thus, disclosure is likely to be effective only where the public can understand
the information disclosed, where it is free to choose on the basis of that information, and
where it believes the information is materially relevant to the choice." STEPHEN BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 164 (1982). The notice requirement in Casarotto can be
seen as a disclosure requirement. As such, it seems inoffensive. It allows consumers to
"shop" for contracts on the basis of the dispute resolution mechanism just as Truth-in-
Lending assists them in shopping for interest rates or Magnuson-Moss assists them in
shopping for warranties. I would have no objection to adoption of a federal law requiring
disclosure of arbitration clauses.
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But some regulation is merely paternalistic-it prevents
people from making choices that the government does not want
them to make. We have to be wary of paternalistic regulation,
for it is often doomed. Americans notoriously don't like the
government to tell them what to do, and will exercise their
freedom of contract to the limit to get what they want. For the
system to work, government has to trust people, even to the
extent of letting them enter "bad" contracts, that is, contracts
that may contain terms that are, on balance, unfavorable to
them. The government does its best work when it sticks to
furthering the competitive aspects of the system and leaves the
deal-making to the parties. It may take some courage, but the
Montana Supreme Court has to learn to say, "We think
arbitration is bad for you, but if you are going to choose it, you
have our blessing."
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